What Is “Prison Islam”?

The process used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) (see http://www.bop.gov/)
for selecting Muslim religious services providers drew razor-sharp attention from the U.S. Congress following a February 2003 Wall Street Journal article reporting that a BOP Muslim contractor “defended the September 11 terrorist attacks and believed black inmates who converted to Islam in prison were logical recruits for committing future terrorist attacks against the U.S.”* Senators Charles Schumer, Jon Kyl, and Dianne Feinstein requested that the inspector general of the Department of Justice conduct a full review of policies and procedures for selection of individuals who provide Islamic religious services to federal inmates (see also Biots #123 & #124 at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_123.html and http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_124.html).

The BOP houses approximately 150,000 inmates in 105 BOP facilities nationwide. Approximately 9,000 inmates (6 percent of the inmate population) seek Islamic religious services. Approximately 85 percent of Muslim inmates identify themselves as either Sunni Muslims or Nation of Islam Muslims (a U.S. group following the teachings of Elijah Muhammad). Less than 1 percent of Muslim inmates—mostly from Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran—are Shiite Muslims. Wahhabism is a form of Sunni Islam (see Biot #123: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_123.html). A critical shortage of Muslim chaplains, which comprise approximately 4 percent of BOP chaplains, often results in performance of religious services by Muslim volunteers, contractors, or inmates.

According to BOP policy, religious groups and religious services providers cannot

• advocate violence;
• make statements against the U.S., including statements that support or condone terrorism; or
• discriminate against other inmates or exclude them from their services, whether based on race, religion, or other discriminatory factors.

In addition, the following religious practices and activities are explicitly prohibited:

• Proselytizing;
• Profanity;
• Consumption of alcohol;
• Paramilitary exercises;
• Self-defense training;
• Animal sacrifice;
• Casing of spells or curses;
• Nudity;
• Sexual acts;
• Self-mutilation;
• Use or display of weapons;
• Ingestion of illegal substances; and
• Encryption.

One of the challenges of vetting potential BOP Muslim religious service providers is that Islam, unlike other religions, has no national Islamic decision-making body to recognize official Islamic religious leaders or authorize them to minister to others (bolding by editor). The BOP Muslim chaplains explain that “in Muslim countries, the government, not organizations, endorses religious leaders.” (p.18, bolding by editor) As a result, Muslims in the U.S. have created national organizations, such as the Islamic Society of North America, in part to fulfill the endorsing role. The FBI provided a classified addendum to the report which provides more information about Islamic organizations and individuals that are “of interest” (i.e., pose a security threat”).

Prison systems “throughout the world have been and continue to be breeding grounds for radicalism…the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes.” For example, radicalization has been a serious concern for decades in France where more than half of the penitentiary inmates are Muslim who have been indoctrinated in the principles of a holy war against ‘the Western powers and the Jews who manipulate them.’”** Richard Reid (the “shoe bomber”) converted to Islam in a British prison and left the prison with radical leanings preached by Islamic clerics who visited and preached at the prison. Jose Padilla (the “dirty bomber”) converted to Islam after serving time in a Broward County, Florida, jail where authorities suspect his Islamic radicalization began.

According to the FBI, “it is likely that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda will attempt to radicalize and recruit inmates in the U.S.”*** Inmates are logical targets for terrorist recruitment, according to FBI officials because they may

• be predisposed to violence;
• feel disenfranchised from society;
• desire power and influence;
• seek revenge against those who incarcerated them
• be hostile towards authority and the U.S., or
• cling to a radical or extremist Islamic “family.”

In addition, prisons have large populations of non-Arab Muslim inmates who are increasingly valuable for terrorism recruitment, since they may not received the same level of scrutiny as Middle Eastern Muslims. Moreover, the immense amount of wealth associated with extreme Wahhabism/Salafism makes the religious appealing to inmates who are seeking financial support after they leave prison.

BOP officials believe that some Muslim contractors and volunteers are responsible for radicalizing inmates in U.S. prisons. Some Muslim chaplains, however, lay the blame with inmates. For example, one Muslim chaplain said that at his prison, some Islamic extremist inmates told other inmates that if they were going to convert to Islam, they had to overthrow the government because “Muslims aren’t cowards.” (p. 8) Other chaplains said that convicted terrorists from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were put into their prisons’ general populations where they radicalized inmates and told them that “terrorism was part of Islam.” Another chaplain observed some inmates from foreign countries politicizing Islam and radicalizing inmates, who in turn radicalize more inmates when they transfer to other prisons.

In addition to terrorist radicalization and recruitment, some Muslim chaplains noted a version of Islam they call “Prison Islam,” which results when inmates follow Islam “without direction or analysis.” These inmates distort Islam to encompass prison values such as gangs and loyalty to other inmates. The chaplains say they “frequently have to oppose Prison Islam in their institutions because it threatens prison security.” (p. 8)

In his final report, the inspector general summarized the deficiencies as follows:

• the BOP typically does not examine the doctrinal beliefs of applicants for religious service positions to determine whether those beliefs are inconsistent with BOP security policies;
• the BOP and the FBI have not adequately exchanged information regarding the BOP’s Muslim endorsing organizations;
• because the BOP currently has no national Islamic organizations willing or able to provide endorsements for its Muslim chaplain candidates, the BOP’s hiring of new Muslim chaplains is effectively frozen, resulting in a shortage of Muslim chaplains within the BOP;
• the BOP does not effectively use the expertise of its current Muslim chaplains to screen, recruit, and supervise Muslim religious service providers;
• once contractors and certain volunteers gain access to BOP facilities, ample opportunity exists for them to deliver inappropriate and extremist messages without supervision from BOP staff members;
• BOP inmates often lead Islamic religious services, subject only to intermittent supervision from BOP staff members, which enhances the likelihood that inappropriate content can be delivered to inmates; and
• within the BOP’s chapels, significant variations exist in the level of supervision provided by correctional officers
.

• screen all religious services providers’ doctrinal beliefs;
• require all chaplains, religious contractors, and religious volunteer applicants to be interviewed by at least one individual knowledgeable of the applicant’s religion;
• require panel interviews for all religious contractors and volunteers;
• implement further security screening requirements for religious services providers;
• encourage chaplains to seek information about contractor and volunteer applicants from their local communities;
• take steps to improve and increase the information flow between the BOP and the FBI;
• more effectively use the expertise of its current Muslim chaplains to screen, recruit, and supervise Muslim religious services providers;
• consider implementing alternative endorsement requirements for Muslim chaplains;
• evaluate the feasibility of having correctional officers provide intermittent supervision to all chapels to supplement the supervision provided by chaplaincy staff;
• evaluate the cost, legality, and feasibility of audio and video monitoring to include all worship areas and chapel classrooms;
• limit and more closely supervise inmate-led religious services;
• provide staff with training on Islam;
• conduct an inventory of chapel books and videos and re-screen them to confirm
• become fully integrated into local counterterrorism initiatives.that they are permissible under BOP security policies; and

* * *

*U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General: “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers” April 2004, p. 35. The full report is available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf.

** “Terrorist recruitment [as opposed o radicalization of Islamic inmates] means the solicitation of individuals to commit terrorist acts or engage in behavior for a terrorism purpose,” according to definitions used by the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force.

***John S. Pistole, Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division, Statement for the Record Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee (October 14, 2003).