How Thomas Jefferson Tamed the Barbary Coast Mussulmen: America’s First Foreign Policy Crisis

When Thomas Jefferson became US President in 1801, he had had interactions with rulers of the Barbary States of North Africa for at least fifteen years, first as Ambassador to France and then as Secretary of State to President George Washington. He and Congress were fed up with what they considered outrageous blackmail. The slogan of the day became: “Millions for defense, not a penny for tribute.” This was a change in tenor from President John Adams who declared in 1787: “We ought not to fight them at all, unless we determine to fight them forever.”*

Congress immediately ended tributes. The Pasha Yusuf of Tripoli became enraged and, on May 10, 1801, declared war on the US, the beginning the “Tripolitan War,” also called the “Barbary Wars” of 1801-1805. The pasha’s allies in Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis followed suit. Jefferson, anticipating the pasha’s actions, had already informed Congress and sent three frigates (the President, the Philadelphia, and the Essex, and the war sloop Enterprise) under the command of Commodore Richard Dale to defend American interests in the Mediterranean.

When Commodore Dale reached Gibraltar on July 1, 1801, he learned that war had already been declared on his ships, and quickly shifted his mission from a cruise of observation to a state of war. He ordered the bulk of his squadron to Tripoli, which, he learned, was protected by a rocky reef and a large citadel with smaller forts overlooking the harbor.

Map of Tripoli Harbor, published in 1764. Note location of rocky reefs on which William Bainbridge ran the Philadelphia aground. Source: http://historic-cities.huji.ac.il/libya/tripoli/maps/roux_1764_pl_55.html

Map of Tripoli citadel. Founded by Phoenicians as trading station beside natural harbor; it was one of three cities in the Tripolis region. It prospered under Romans and under Vandals in 5th century, and became an Arab administrative center in the 7th century. It became part of the Ottoman Empire 1551. It was an active Barbary pirate base between 1711-1835.Source: http://historic-cities.huji.ac.il/libya/tripoli/tripoli.html

Since Congress would not declare war, the frigates could only weakly blockade Tripoli (and ports along the 1,200-mile coastline) and harass the pirate corsairs. In April 1802, Dale was replaced by Commodore Richard Morris who arrived in Gibraltar in June with an additional fleet of seven frigates, sloop, his wife and their child. “Although his orders were to “proceed with the whole squadron under your command and lie off Tripoli,” he chose to continue Dale’s policy of acting as escort to American merchant ships sailing to various destinations around the Mediterranean. In September 1803, Morris was recalled to the United States. Furious at his lack of initiative, Jefferson dismissed him form the navy when a court of inquiry censured him for lack of diligence.”**

After two years of war with Tripoli, the US had accomplished little. But all this changed when Commodore Edward Preble assumed command of a seven-ship, 1,000 man fleet in June 1803. “A veteran of the Continental Navy, Preble had been a prisoner of the British aboard the notorious prison hulk Jersey. Preble had a reputation as a short-tempered and stern disciplinarian. However, he was admired for his great courage, his fairness in dealing with his men, and his expertise as a mariner.”* Indeed, Preble trained a group of men devoted to him (e.g., Stephen Decatur, William Bainbridge and others) during that voyage that became later heroes of the US Navy.

Commodore Edward Preble (1761-1807).
Source: http://www.usspreble.com/commodor.html

In October 1803, Captain William Bainbridge (the same man who was forced to sail the USS George Washington to Istanbul—see end of Biot #220 at http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_220.html) ran aground the USS Philadelphia on a reef at the entrance to Tripoli harbor. The pasha’s men quickly took the ship and crew and moved them near the Tripoli citadel. Preble knew that he had no chance of recapturing the Philadelphia. Instead, he sent Lieutenant Stephen Decatur into the harbor on a night raid using a captured Tripolitan ship, now renamed the Intrepid. The Intrepid coasted up to the Philadelphia, boarded her, set her on fire, and escaped. As a result of these heroic efforts, Decatur, at age 25 years, was appointed the youngest captain in the US Navy. This early naval event is one of the most famous in naval history.

Preble pressed on. He repeatedly shelled Tripoli, all the while requesting that the pasha, now Karamanli, negotiate for the release of Bainbridge and his crew. In September 1804, Preble tried to run a raiding party into the harbor by loading the Intrepid with gunpowder and exploding it amongst the corsair ships. This plan, however, failed, as pirates cannoned the Intrepid and blew it up, obliterating the ship and its crew. Preble was called home and replaced by Commodore Barron, who continued the blockade of Tripoli. Preble died just a year later from tuberculosis.

Meanwhile, the American consul in Tunis, William Eaton, came up with a new idea: replacing Yusuf Karamanli with his older, exiled brother named Hamet who lived in Egypt. Eaton assembled an army of mercenaries in Egypt, supported by a detachment of ten US marines form the American ship Argus. Eaton, the ten marines and the mercenaries trekked 500 miles along the North African coast to reach the rich Barbary port of Derna in 1805, which they captured, thereby creating a back door to Tripoli.

Map of location of Derna, relative to Tripoli.
Source: http://www.libyacruiseservices.com/images/derna.jpg

Meanwhile, Jefferson had opened negotiations with Yusuf Karamanli through Tobias Lear, former Secretary to George Washington. The Yusuf realized that he was doomed, negotiated for peace by accepting the last America offer of $60,000 for the release of the American prisoners and approved a new treaty that did not require tribute payments. Eaton’s mercenaries were denied the opportunity of the spoils of war and rebelled and Hamet returned to Egypt. The American fleet returned to American waters and the public largely forgot about the Barbary threat.

In 1807, however, the Algerians (not the Tripolitans) seized three American ships and again demanded ransom. Thus, the Barbary threat continued in this way for another seven years. “Following the War of 1812, Stephen Decatur entered the Mediterranean with ten tall ships and the steely determination that made him a hero. Like Preble before him, he let his cannon do the talking. Fighting fire with fire, he took 486 prisoners and forced the Algerians to pay a ransom of $10,000, to release all captives immediately, and to cease and desist all demands for further tribute from America forever. Such insurmountable logic was not lost on the Dey. Likewise the Dey of Tunis paid Decatur $46,000 to not hurt him, and the Pasha of Tripoli contributed $25,000 to see the last of the Americans. Decatur finally broke the Barbary threat with the only weapon the pirates understood.”***

Editor’s Note : Some observers have drawn parallels between the Barbary Mussulmen pirates and Islamic terrorists of today. The two groups are similar in their considerable skill in wielding the hostage tool to gain their ends, but the Barbary pirates were not jihadists—they did not, as far as we know, terrorize merchant shipping in the name of Allah with the intent of eradicating infidels from the face of the Earth. Rather, they terrorized ships to acquire revenues to support their way of life. It is possible that the two groups are similar in that if they ever stopped terrorizing civilians, no one would any longer fear them.

Lasting lessons learned from the Barbary wars include the maxim articulated by President James Madison (fourth US President, 1809-1817), as follows: “the United States, whilst they wish for war with no nation, will buy peace with none.” Furthermore he said, “the settled policy” of the United States is that “as peace is better than war, war is better than tribute.”****

Sources:

* “John Adams” by David McCullough. Simon & Schuster. 2001, p. 366.

** “The Barbary Wars 1801-1805” in the “Mariners’ Museum: Birth of the U.S. Navy” available at: http:www.mariner.org/usnavy/06/06a.htm.

*** “ America’s First War on Terror” by Paul Fallon. Available at: http://www.deanesmay.com/archives/000374.html.

**** “The United States and the Barbary Pirates” at Constitutional Rights Foundation B ill of Right in Action Fall 2001 (18:1) Africa. Available at: http://www.crf-usa.org/bria/bria18_1.htm#pirates.