CSX Freight Train Derailment and Subsequent Fire in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland on July 18, 2001 - Continued

As noted in Biot #255 at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_255.html, the CSX freight train derailment and fire in Baltimore’s Howard Street Tunnel in 2001 was a serious hazardous materials incident, a special category to which only the worst incidents are assigned by the US Department of Transportation. The City of Baltimore is a central transportation hub for the Northeast Corridor of the US and is a major transit point for the movement of freight. Two railroads service the city: Norfolk Southern and CSX. CSX owns and operates the Howard Street Tunnel, which is the only direct rail link between the northeast, southeast, and mid-Atlantic regions. Put another way, the tunnel is the only freight through-route on the Northeast corridor. Between 28 and 32 trains move through it every day.

Howard Street and the Howard Street Tunnel are located in the heart of Baltimore’s business and cultural districts, next to Oriole Park at Camden Yards, the Baltimore Ravens’ football stadium, the Inner Harbor, the National Aquarium, the Maryland State Government office complex, University of Maryland Medical Center (medical school, university hospital, shock-trauma unit), Maryland General Hospital, Mercy Hospital, and the City’s art district (Meyerhoff Symphony Hall and the Lyric Opera House), among other entities. Howard Street also intersects all major surface transportation systems in Baltimore, including interstate and state highways and city streets.

The Howard Street Tunnel was built in 56 months out of 30 million bricks that run for 1.7 miles underground (between 49 feet and 3 feet underground) through the heart of Baltimore. Until 1884, the B&O Railroad leased a track through Baltimore to connect its eastern and western routes. In 1884, a competitor purchased the track, leaving the B&O with no way to go through Baltimore. The hills were too steep to build a track around the western edge of the city, so the B&O opted to build the tunnel under Howard Street. The tunnel opened in 1895. Trains using the tunnel traverse a steep uphill run of 4.8% from the south end of the tunnel to the north end. On the south end is Camden Yards. On the day of the derailment the Baltimore Orioles were playing a double header.

At 3:04 pm on July 18, 2001, the 60-car CSX freight train entered the Howard Street Tunnel, pulled by three engines and manned by two engineers. The load included 31 full cars and 29 empty cars with a mix of freight that included paper products, plywood, soy oil, and several tank cars containing hazardous materials. At 3:07 pm, the engineers heard a grinding noise, saw the air pressure in the brake line drop, felt a lurch and then noted that the train came to an abrupt stop. Their radio did not work as they were in a dead zone in the tunnel, but at 3:15 pm, one of the engineers used his cell phone to reach the train master to report the problem that the train was stopped in the tunnel. The fumes were getting worse, so the engineers cleared the tunnel with their three engines decoupled from the rest of the train at 3:27 pm. The fumes and smoke continued to worsen, which suggested to the engineers that the train cars remaining inside the tunnel were on fire. They reviewed the bill of lading, which listed the train’s contents. Hazardous materials were listed on the bill, so the engineers contacted the Baltimore City firefighters “somewhere between 3:35 pm and 4:15 pm” (the time is disputed).

From the time the BCFD arrived at 4:15 pm (1 hour 8 minutes after the train unexpectedly stopped in the tunnel, time zero) and assumed incident command responsibilities, the management of the disaster moved quickly. At 4:15 pm, CSX Transportation notified the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE)-Emergency Response Division of the derailment of train cars carrying hazardous materials, whose staff arrived to the scene in 5 minutes. They contact the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Baltimore City Fire Department Battalion Chief 6, and Baltimore City Fire Department’s hazardous materials coordinator. Light rail and rail freight movement were disrupted so the Maryland Transit Authority initiated a bus bridge to bring light-rail passengers around the tunnel. Freight trains were rerouted as far west as Ohio.

At 4:20 pm, the Chief of the City Fire Department requested that all major roads (I-395, I-83, US-40) into Baltimore City be closed. Baltimore City Police Department and Department of Public Works worked quickly to bring this about. Still, no one was really sure about the identity or harmfulness of the hazardous materials that were presumed to be burning in the tunnel, which was so hot by this time (1474 degrees Fahrenheit), that firefighters could not enter. MDE requested a chemist from the private sector mutual aid plan known as the South Baltimore Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP), which produced two chemists immediately. A 4:35 pm (1 hour 28 minutes after time zero) the chemists declared that there was a potential for hydrogen fluoride vapor from one of the tanker cars containing fluorosilicic acid (but see more below). This type of exposure requires special medical treatment.

Enter Baltimore City emergency managers, who decided (and MDE concurred) at 4:45 pm to sound the sirens to notify nearby residents to shelter in place (the actual sounding occurred at 5: 45 pm, 2 hours 38 minutes after time zero). At 4:53 pm the MDE contacted the US Coast Guard, which 7 minutes later closed Inner Harbor to boat traffic. Meanwhile, Orioles’ office workers were told to leave the B & O Warehouse. The MDE and SBIMAP began air quality monitoring at 4:53 pm.

At 6:15 pm, water from a broken water main located under the asphalt of the Howard and Lombard Street intersections, flooded the streets and poured down into the Howard Street Tunnel below. By 9 pm, roads were reopening sporadically. At 11 pm, the water to the water main that was broken was cut off so that repairs could begin.

Why this hazmat incident qualified as serious.

The incident was categorized as serious for two reasons: a release and exposure to fire resulted in the closure of major rail, surface, and marine transportation arteries, and 28,600 gallons of tripropylene, a flammable material, were released (see Biot 255 for list of criteria for serious incident). This incident was understandably difficult to frame initially by responders because of its complexity: it was a.) a fire, b.) a tunnel, c.) a hazardous materials incident, d.) under a major city and East Coast crossroads, and e.) during rush hour. It occurred before September 11, 2001, although the potential for terrorists causing the whole thing couldn’t have been ruled out, even in July 2001 when the US was beginning to appreciate the threat. In the official reports, no mention of terrorist activities is mentioned.

Other facets of incident.

1. The exact location of the fire was not determined until about 5:00 am the following morning, which was when the fire was located directly below the water main break. To fight the fire, the firefighters used a manhole on Howard Street, approximately 50 feet from the water main break, which was determined to have a connection to the tunnel. Firefighters (bravely) entered the manhole and gained access to an alcove in the tunnel near the fire, and from their fought the fire.

2. The major fire suppression effort ended on Sunday, July 22, when three rail cars (boxcars of paper and plywood) were removed from the tunnel. The water main break was stopped also on July 22. On inspection of the tunnel that same day, engineers note no significant structural damage, and on July 24, the tunnel was cleared for traffic.

3. The initial challenges faced by the City once the fire was detected were threefold:

identifying the exact location of the fire in the 1.7 mile tunnel; determining the potential environmental impact from the burning cars containing hazardous materials; and determining whether downtown Baltimore needed to be evacuated. Identifying the location of the fire so that firefighters could be it out was hampered by the smoke and intense heat and the tunnel’s 4.8% grade, which created a chimney effect that hampered entrance to the tunnel. Initial fire suppression efforts were unable to penetrate very far into the tunnel, but the water main break flooded the tunnel and helped to control the fire. The firefighters were also able to locate the fire through the manhole route described in #1 above.

The two chemists made the determination that the hazardous materials involved in the fire would not, either individually or in combination, present a serious environmental hazard (although see above, HF vapor ??), and therefore evacuating the downtown would not be necessary. Instead, sheltering in place for the general public was appropriate. Residents were advised to stay indoors and to turn off their air conditioning to avoid smoke intake. When the sirens sounded at 5:45 pm, some people became confused and, instead of turning on radios and televisions (the intent of sounding the sirens), flooded 9-1-1 with calls to ask what was going on.

4. Closing the major rail, surface transportation, and marine arteries was a real problem for people in Baltimore trying to get out of Baltimore or move to another part of the city, and people outside of Baltimore trying to get in or through Baltimore. No one was hurt, though, and the inconvenience passed. The most significant contribution to the management of the incident from advanced technology came in the use of the variable message signs with a message advising that inbound routes to Baltimore were closed as well as highway advisory radio messaging.

5. As noted by Baltimore City Fire Battalion Chief Buzz Melton during his talk July 2005 (see Securitas “Is the Incident Command System Efficacious? A Retired Baltimore City Battalion Fire Chief Analyzes the Facts” at: http://www.semp.us/securitas/jjuly_august2005.html) finding the person with the credentials and knowledge base is critical to incident management. The SBIMAP chemists from the private sector performed admirably in this capacity and were key in the successful response to the crisis. Once this assessment was made that the hazardous materials were environmentally safe, an appropriate containment strategy was implemented to handle the leaking chemicals. Furthermore, the public information officials were able to inform the media that no environmental disaster was imminent and request that the general public receive this information. In addition, CSX offered the services of its contractors to help with fire suppression and removal of cars from the tunnel. This level of private sector cooperation and support played a critical role in the good outcome.

6. “The National Transportation Safety Board, after an exhaustive investigative effort, could not identify convincing evidence to explain the derailment of CSX freight train L-412-16 in the Baltimore, Maryland, Howard Street Tunnel on July 18, 2001. No preaccident equipment defects or rail defects were found. Computer simulations were used to evaluate locomotive event recorder data, train profile data, track profile data, and preaccident track geometry data. These simulations indicated that neither train operations nor changes in track conditions alone likely resulted in a derailment. Available physical evidence and computer simulations also showed that the most likely derailment scenario involved an obstruction between a wheel and the rail, in combination with changes in track geometry. However, postaccident fire, flooding, and necessary emergency response activities, including removing burning freight cars from the tunnel, significantly disturbed the accident site; and, no obstruction was identified that could be convincingly connected to wheel climb and evidence was insufficient to determine changes in track geometry.” However, the same report notes that a 6 inch obstruction on the inside of the north rail would derail the lead truck of the car to the south. An obstruction would also account for the “suddenness” of the incident. However, evidence supporting an obstruction was weak.

7. Tunnel maintenance and inspections were not reliably documented by CSX. For example, there was an opening in the tunnel’s arch immediately below the 40-inch water main where a repair had at least been started, but not documented. In addition the exchange of information between CSX and the City of Baltimore was inadequate. This was identified as a real opportunity for improvement since modification of structures and utilities near the tunnel could have a significant effect on the tunnel’s structural integrity, and therefore on the structures of other nearby facilities.

Editor’s Note: Well, it sounds like the rails need some redundancy in Baltimore. Build a new tunnel! Also, we can be certain that this tunnel is well monitored since September 11, 2001.

Sources:

1. NSTB Railroad Accident Brief #DCA-01-MR-004: “CSX Freight Train Derailment and Subsequent Fire in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland, on July 18, 2001” at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAB0408.htm. Accessed August 23, 2005.

2. “Effects of Catstrophic Events on Transportation System Managemetn and Operations: Howard Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore City, Maryland, July 18, 2001, Findings” prepared by SAIC July 2002 for the US Department of Transportation ITS Joint Program Office. Available online at: http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov/JPODOCS/REPTS_TE/13754.html.

3. “Almost a Worst-Case Scenario”: The Baltimore Tunnel Fire of 2001,” Parts A, B, C. Written by Esther Scott for Herman B. Leonard, George F. Baker, and Arnold Howitt, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, for use at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Funded by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Copyright 2004. Available for a modest fee and http://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/.