“Why the 1900 Galveston Hurricane was not a Disaster”

The 1900 Galveston hurricane was not a disaster. It was a catastrophe. Disaster and catastrophe are different. They are different not only because of semantics. A catastrophe is quantitatively and qualitatively different than a disaster in six ways described below. This distinction has become more apparent since the occurrence of certain very large-scale “disasters” in American society, including the impacts of Hurricane Hugo on St. Croix ( Virgin Islands), Hurricane Andrew on Homestead, Florida, and last month’s Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Looking even further back in history, two other events stand out as catastrophes: the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire and 1900 Galveston hurricane.

Much of the story of the 1900 Galveston hurricane discussed below is derived from a primary source anthology of first-hand reports in the days after the storm, which a well-known journalist of the time named Nathan C. Green, published in 1900. Penguin Books republished the book for the first time in 2000.

The unique dimensions of catastrophes compared to disasters are derived from a new essay by EL Quarantelli titled, “Catastrophes are different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina.” This essay will soon be available on the Social Science Research Council website at: http://www.ssrc.org/.

19 th Century Galveston-Hurricane Disasters

Before 1900, Galveston had already experienced many hurricane disasters. For example, “in 1857 the entire island was flooded, and the waters of Galveston bay and Gulf met over it so that completely disappeared from view; but the town was then a small one, and the loss of life inconsiderable. In the storm of October 3, 1867, Galveston again went under water, the Gulf pouring over it so that Mechanic street, the principal business thoroughfare, was six feet deep, and it then was on the edge of the storm and did not catch its full force. Again, in 1871, it was twice beneath the waters, first in June and again in September, one flood coming from the waters on the Gulf, the other when the water was piled up in the bay until it swept through the principal streets back to the Gulf of Mexico. In October, 1973, and in September, 1875, and December, 1877, the town was again flooded.

“Thus five times in ten years Galveston was swept by the waves and became a second Venice, all of its streets being from two to five feet under water. All of those storms were severe and did great damage, although Galveston caught only their fringe. But the storm of 1875 was by far the worst…The storm did Galveston an immense amount of damage, and there were lives lost all along the Texas coast, but the city escaped a great catastrophe…Forty persons were drowned in and around Galveston. Morgan’s dredging fleet was sunk, the government works swept away and incalculable harm done…The storm of 1886…was the last serious one to visit Galveston, and again that town was flooded.” (P. 235-7)

This long history of brushes with, but no direct hits by, severe storms helps to explain why people living in Galveston on Saturday and Sunday September 8-9, 1900, chose to shut themselves in their houses and wait for the storm to blow, rather than seeking places of safety.

Galveston Topography

Galveston is one of many low-lying sand islands fringing the shores of Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas for a distance of nearly 1,000 miles. “Stretching from Mobile to the Rio Grande are islands ranging from ten to twenty miles long and from one to two miles wide. They are composed almost exclusively of sand underlaid by clay or quicksands, covered in part with a coarse, scraggy sea grass. They begin at Dauphine Island and stretch westward as follows: Petit Bois, Horn, Dear, Ship, Cat, the Chandeleurs, Breton, Bird, Grand, Timbalier, Caillon, Last Island, Marsh, Galveston, Matagorda, St. Joseph, Mustang and Sadie. Chienier, Caminada and Indianola are in reality islands, although technically not known as such, being separated from the mainland by swamps always under water.” (226-227) These islands repeatedly experience ferocious storms, which erode, sever in half, and reshape the islands sometimes beyond recognition.

For example, the US government, on the persistent demands of the people of Louisiana and Mississippi, established its Gulf quarantine station on Chandeleur Island in what was supposed to be a very safe spot,” according to Green. “In the storm of 1886…the quarantine officers had just time to get away from the station. When the physicians went back to look for their station they could not find a trace of it. The very site had disappeared…The station was never rebuilt.” (p. 228) Similar kinds of Gulf island experiences fill books.

City of Galveston in 1900

In 1900, Galveston was the first city of Texas commercially and third in size by population (38,000 people). It was the county seat of Galveston county (as it is today), and was situated on the northeastern end of Galveston Island at the mouth of Galveston Bay. It was the second largest port on the Gulf coast after New Orleans, which, after all is really a Mississippi River port, thus making Galveston Island at the time the largest port on the Gulf Coast. Galveston is about 50 miles south of Houston, Texas.

The island lies east to west approximately 27 miles, and, at its widest point north to south, is 7 miles. Its elevation is slightly above sea level with no part of the city more than 10 feet above sea level. The city proper is on the inner side of the island, which protects it from the sweep of ocean storms, but exposes it to Galveston Bay inundations when the conditions are right.

Galveston in the late 1800s was a prosperous importing (goods from the East Coast) and exporting (cotton, grain in huge storage-houses) port for the entire US. There were three trunk lines of railway running into Galveston (the Missouri Pacific, the Santa Fe and the International lines), which crossed Galveston Bay on steel trestle bridges, each about two miles in length, which were, together with the wagon bridge (probably the longest in the world) destroyed by the flood. Many houses on the island were perched on pilings and stood 8-10 feet from the ground as a precaution against floods. The south side of the city, beginning within 50 yards of the Gulf tide, was the best residential part of the city. Some homes were stone and brick, but most were of wooden frame. Galveston boasted 35 churches, 30 hotels, 4 national banks, and 2 daily newspapers at the time the 1900 hurricane struck the city.

Galveston Hurricane Catastrophe

The 1900 Galveston storm began a 2 a.m. on Saturday, September 8, and raged for the next 16 hours until finally moving on. At 9 a.m., wind gusts swept over the island and waves were “snappy and menacing,” according to Green. By 9:30 a.m. there was a stiff gale blowing, which pushed water several blocks inland on both the bay and Gulf sides of Galveston. At this point, many people from hundreds of homes sensed that this storm was different and waded or swam to the highest points in the city to seek safety. Higher ground homes and buildings, such as the Tremont Hotel, which occupied the highest point in the city, accepted all refugees, “black or white”, according to Green. By 3:00 p.m. the island was completely submerged and the electricity and gas plants gave out leaving the city in darkness. Rain was falling in torrents.

“To go upon the streets was to court death. The wind was then at cyclonic height, roofs, cisterns, portions of buildings, telegraphy poles and walls were falling and the noise of the winds and the crashing of the buildings were terrifying in the extreme,” wrote Green.

Waters rose at about 15 inches per hour. By 9:30 p.m. the water in the Tremont Hotel’s lobby covered the desk and the pages of the register. Buildings, such as the Ritter Building, gave way, killing people huddled inside “like rats in traps.” The waters suddenly gave way at 1:45 a.m. Sunday and within 20 minutes had gone down to two feet. By morning, the streets were devoid of flood water. Not until Sunday dawned did survivors begin to realize the scope of the catastrophe. On Monday, September 10, 1906, the storm had cleared even more revealing devastation.

Five blocks on the Gulf beach side of the city had been swept of everything, the timbers and debris shoved up by turbulent waters to create a wall 30 to 40 feet high on Sixth street. On the bay side, wharves and grain elevators were completely destroyed and big ships lay strewn about. Dead bodies were everywhere, approximately 6,000 in all. Coffins and caskets from one of the cemeteries at Galveston were being fished out of the water.

Social Dimensions following the Galveston Hurricane Catastrophe

The Galveston hurricane impact resulted in six dimensions of human social behavior during catastrophes, which are different than human social behaviors exhibited in disasters, according to Quarantelli.

First, most or all of the community-built structures in Galveston were heavily damaged, which made it impossible for displaced victims to seek shelter with nearby relatives and friends, as they typically did in disaster situations. In addition, most of the facilities and operational bases of most emergency organizations were themselves hit, making them inoperable. The following major city structures were demolished: the beach barracks housing 100 soldiers, the Galveston News office, the Union Depot, Moody Bank building, Tremont Hotel engine house, the power-house of the street railway company, Sealy hospital, the Sisters’ Orphan Hospital, and St. Mary’s Infirmary (including most patients and staff), Ball High School and the Rosenberg School buildings, three railroad bridges and the county bridge across to the mainland, the Pat O’Keefe beach resort, the great bathing pavilion known as the Pagoda, the big pleasure resort known as the Olympia, and Murdoch’s bathhouse.

The editor of the Galveston News wrote: “We have thousands of homeless people in the city, and while free transportation is offered to those who wish to go, there are many who have no friends to go to. These people must be cared for. Some are now crowded in the homes of friends and others are located in the large buildings in the business district. All are only temporarily provided for. Something must be done to house them at least temporarily when cold weather approaches…I am no advocate of ramshackle shanties as permanent buildings in the city—in any part of it. But I appreciate the fact that we are facing an emergency that requires prompt action to prevent severe suffering in the near future. Galveston people have not in the past turned their faces against the suffering poor, and I do not think they will do so in the future.” (p. 83)

Another observer wrote: “The little parks are full of homeless people; the prairies around Galveston are doted with little camp-fires, where the homeless and destitute are trying to gather their scattered families together and find out who among them are dead and who are living. There are thousands and thousands of families in Galveston today without food or properties or a place to lay their heads.” (p. 101)

In disasters, by contrast to catastrophes, people make their way to friends and relatives homes for temporary shelter.

Second,most local officials were unable to undertake their usual work role because they were dead or injured. For example, Police Officer John Bowie on Sunday morning “was found in a pitiable condition. His reported that his house, with wife and children, had been swept into the Gulf.” (p. 17) The bridge-tenders and their families drowned. The soldiers drowned. “Dr. West, one of the prominent physicians of Galveston, was drowned near the Rosenberg School building, whither he had gone to attend a patient who was reported to be injured.” (p. 13). However, the mayor had survived and, on Sunday morning, convened a few citizens (the Galveston Relief Committee) in a silt-laden room of the Tremont Hotel to try to formulate some plans of relief, which included clearing debris to create a route from the bay to the Gulf side so that outside help might arrive. The small group, however, did not have a good grasp on the scope of the catastrophe: they suggested that the interment of the dead could not be legally performed without the assistance of a coroner’s inquest. (p. 52) As it turned out, the ground was too full of water to bury the dead and the community turned to burial of hundreds and hundreds of bodies at sea.

Nevertheless, the group successfully crafted an appeal for help from the outside: “A conservative estimate of the loss of life is that it will reach 3000. At least 5000 families are shelterless and wholly destitute. The entire remainder of the population is suffering in greater or less degree. Not a single church, school or charitable institution, of which Galveston had so many, is left intact. Not a building escaped damage, and half the whole number were entirely obliterated. There is immediate need for food, clothing and household goods of all kinds. If nearby cities will open asylums for women and children the situation will be greatly relieved. Coast cities should send us water as well as provisions, including kerosene oil, gasoline and candles.” (p. 117)

Because local personnel were casualties and the usual community resources were not available, many leadership roles were taken by outsiders to the community, which is another aspect the second dimension of human social behavior during catastrophes. For example, Captain Rafferty, commanding US troops in Galveston, was sent in with 70 soldiers to do police duty. Three regiments were sent from Houston and the city placed under marital law to stabilize drunkenness (people were drinking liquor scattered about in boxes in place of water to quench their thirst) and looting of effects (rings, other jewelry) from dead bodies. (p. 58)

A potential negative consequence of outsiders having to come in to stabilize a catastrophic situation was local-outsider friction. For example, on September 16, 1906, General Scurry had Galveston under marital law. “[T]here was some friction, because martial law means unusual restraint. But the friction, like the martial law, was a matter temporarily. It would be difficult to challenge the necessity of this measure. There were many defenseless women and children in the city, living in houses without locks and keys, and they had to be protected against prowlers of all kinds. …There were political factions who resented the idea of martial law, but this fact did not for a moment abate the necessity for it,” wrote Green.” (pp. 166-167)

Third, Galveston received immediate help from outside communities with some difficulty. As noted earlier, all the bridges to the mainland were wiped out and dozens of major-sized ships were smashed about. In a disaster, as compared with a catastrophe, massive convergence to the site occurs. But this is not so in catastrophes. The 1900 hurricane that struck Galveston wreaked havoc on 65 nearby cities to the north, including Texas City and Houston, which meant that these communities were themselves in need of support.

One newspaperwoman from Houston gained access to Galveston from Texas City in the following manner: “I begged, cajoled and cried my way through the line of soldiers with drawn swords who guard the wharf at Texas City and sailed across the bay on a little boat which is making irregular trips to meet the relief trains from Houston. Every man on the train [from Houston to Texas City] had lost some one that he loved and was going across the bay [in the boat] to try and find some trace of his family—all except the four men in my party. There were from outside cities— St. Louis, New Orleans and Kansas City. They had lost a large amount of property and were coming down to see if anything could be saved from the wreck. They had been sworn in as deputy sheriffs in order to get into Galveston. The city is under martial law, and no human being who cannot account for himself to the complete satisfaction of the officers in charge can hope to get through.”

By September 12, 1906, word had reached the War Department in Washington DC, which dispatched to Galveston 20,000 rations. An additional 30,000 rations were shipped from St. Louis the same day. An army ration consisted of four ponds of water-free food, sufficient for three meals. (p. 122) About 1500 tents were shipped to Galveston from Fort Myer, the Arsenal in Washington. In the weeks following the catastrophe, aid from around the country flowed to Galveston. Even foreign countries, including Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, and Belgium responded. Emperor William III of Germany wrote to President McKinley: “I wish to convey to your Excellence the expression of my deep-felt sympathy with the misfortune that has befallen the town and harbor of Galveston and many other parts of the coast, and I mourn with you and the people of the United States over the terrible loss of life and property caused by the hurricane…” (p. 134)

Clara Barton of the Red Cross even traveled to Galveston, reaching it on September 16, 1906. She sent out an appeal: “Find greatest immediate needs here are surgical dressings, usual medicines and delicacies for the sick. No epidemic, but many people are worn out with suffering and exertion, who need careful care and proper food.” (p. 137)

Fourth, most, if not all, of the everyday community functions in Galveston were sharply and concurrently interrupted. The best example of this was disposition of the dead. At first, burial was attempted but the ground was too waterlogged to accept the bodies. Next, many bodies were placed on a barge, taken out to sea, weighted down with weights and cast overboard. Cremation was considered since so many decomposing bodies remained hopelessly trapped under wood planks and debris. The thought was to burn the wood and the bodies together. Some people were against this idea as the wood would be needed to build temporary shelters and rebuild the city. Identification of the individual dead became impossible. Thus, usual burial rituals were clearly interrupted during the Galveston hurricane catastrophe.

Fifth, the mass media system, especially journalists from New York and Chicago, attempted to socially construct the Galveston catastrophe. Nathan Green, editor of the anthology noted in the second paragraph at the beginning of this essay, was a Dallas newsman who devoted an entire chapter to “How the News Came.” (pp. 34-45) He made two points: first the news communication system was wiped out and news of Galveston’s fate finally arrived on Sunday from a handful of refugees who made it out of Galveston.

By Tuesday, September 11, 1906, reporters of papers and of the press associations began to reach Galveston and “truthful stories were sent out as fast as telegraph facilities would allow. Of these the people of Galveston had no reason to complain. But with the conscientious reporters came those of the yellow journals of New York and Chicago, and of these they did justly complain,” wrote Green.

He continued: “A few days ago a former New Yorker said: ‘The yellow journals of New York do a great deal of good; they also do a great deal of harm…The people of Galveston greatly appreciate what the New York Papers have done in the way of raising money for suffering Galveston and in sending relief here for those who need it. But they have n o excuse for those of the correspondents who sent out lying reports, some of whom would have permanently injured the city and sent it to its death if the could. They were willing to overlook inaccuracies, which were unavoidable in the confusion of the first few days following the storm, and pardon the use of rumors of loss concerning certain matters before the exact conditions could be learned. But the New York correspondents did not reach here until after the worst was over, and they might have had the truth if they would and had possessed one-tenth the pluck, energy and astuteness of which they have boasted. But some of them not only did not search for the truth, but they absolutely failed to print the truth concerning things which they saw with their own eyes.’” (pp. 40-41)

Sixth, because of the preceding five processes, the national government and top officials became directly involved in the aftermath of the hurricane.

President McKinley ordered troops and supplies to Galveston but did not go himself. He was in the midst of a presidential election campaign with his running mate, Theodore Roosevelt, which he won two months later although he was subsequently assassinated one year after the Galveston hurricane by anarchist Leon Czolgosz. Presidents in the nineteenth century grappled with issues unheard of today. For example, Cabinets did not exist and President McKinley had to arrange for secretarial assistance from his own funds.

McKinley’s Secretary of War was deeply involved in the relief effort through the efforts of numerous generals and their troops stretching from Washington to Galveston. During earlier Galveston hurricane disasters, presidential level interest was not a factor. It was not needed as the local and regional populace could deal with the aftermath of these lesser crises.

In summary, the 1900 Galveston hurricane was not a disaster. It was a catastrophe. We know this because of the six ways in which society reacted in its aftermath. Does it matter whether we label a crisis a disaster or a catastrophe? This writer says yes. Once the dimensions of a crisis become apparent, predictable human responses can be anticipated. Earlier planning can be directed to these predictable human responses. The understanding that a catastrophe is quantitatively and qualitatively different than a disaster, gives clarity, direction, and a sense of stability in the aftermath of an occasion that otherwise is absolutely overwhelming. For example, once a crisis is realized to be a catastrophe, the need for a temporary military intervention sanctioned and led by the US President becomes more understandable and palatable; hypertonic “outsider” media can lay off the ‘yellow journalism” and explosive rumor mongering that inappropriately distorts social realities; and resource inflow to the stricken region can be expeditiously ramped up with the full understanding that the local populace will NOT be able to get out of the mess alone. A disaster does not require this degree of total societal response as it can be handled with the resources at hand within the affected locale.