As Americans come to grips with the New Orleans’ flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge overtopping and breaching multiple levees on August 29, 2005, similar historical flood disasters may provide perspective and guidance. One such flood was the vicious North Sea Storm that crashed into the Netherlands in the early morning hours of February 1, 1953.

On that cold early morning, the North Sea Storm coincided with a high North Sea tide to pound and submerge all or part of two Dutch provinces: 1) “Zeeland” and 2) the southern part of “South Holland”. These provinces lie in the low-lying delta region in the southwest part of the Netherlands. About 1,800 people drowned because levees of insufficient height were overtopped and breached in dozens of places by the storm surge, which reached between 12 and 15 feet above Normal Amsterdam Water Level. The shock of the 1953 flood in Zeeland and South Holland catalyzed the subsequent construction of huge flood control projects, collectively called the “Delta Works”, including the powerful Maeslant Barrier described in Biot 318 (see http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_318.html).
These monumental engineering works are a conceptual level higher than levee systems, regardless of their complexity. Levee systems are still necessary but no longer sufficient to protect high-value urban areas such as Rotterdam and New Orleans from substantive storms, especially as the world sea level continues to rise. The flood control structures used in Europe attempt to block storm surges attempting to enter the mouths of rivers or rivers’ estuaries.

The Netherlands’s Precarious Geography Situation
The Netherlands is a small European country facing the North Sea. Sometimes it is called Holland, but Holland is really the name of only the western part of the country that, since 1840, has been divided into two provinces called North Holland and South Holland. South Holland is home to the Port of Rotterdam, the largest shipping port in Europe. The Port of Rotterdam was the largest port in the world before being denied that distinction by the Ports of Singapore and Shanghai. The smooth functioning of the Port of Rotterdam strengthens the economy of the Netherlands. Conversely, flooding, such as what occurred with the North Sea Storm of 1953, that adversely impacts shipping and Rotterdam may seriously undermine the economy.

Flooding that adversely affects shipping to and from Rotterdam threatens the existence of the Netherlands. This is one of the main reasons why the government of the Netherlands has prioritized the construction of state-of-the-art flood control projects to reduce the probability of flooding in Rotterdam.

Condition of the Dikes in Zeeland and South Holland before the Flood of 1953
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Department of Waterways and Public Works in the Netherlands studied the rivers, sea arms and coasts facing the North Sea, and determined that the height of almost all the dikes was too low. However, no serious flooding had occurred since the northern Netherlands’ Zuider Zee flood in 1916 and, before that, the Christmas flood in 1717. Thus, interest in committing funds to increasing the height of dikes was low. In 1943, the water level in Zeeland was extremely high and water overtopped dikes in many places. Experts predicted severe problems following a high storm tide if defenses were not improved. (1)
In spite of these warnings, during World War II all work on improving the condition of the Zeeland dikes stopped. The Department of Waterways and Public Works instead focused its attention northward on the reclamation of the Zuider Zee (the shallow inland sea in the northwest of the Netherlands), reasoning that reclaiming the Zuider Zee would provide space for agriculture and habitation. The Dutch resistance intentionally bombed the dike system to flood land and chase away Germans. Zeelanders repaired the landscape starting in March 1945 and in February 1946 they had closed all the gaps in the levee system. These unforeseen repairs and continued interest in reclaiming land contaminated by salt to avoid food shortages helped distract attention away from raising the unsafe dikes. (2)
The Gathering Storm
On January 30th, 1953, a depression formed south of Iceland. Ferocious hurricane winds from the northwest steered the storm forming behind the depression, veering it over the entire North Sea. By late January 31, 1953 and early February 1, 1953, the hurricane barreled into Zeeland.
The Submerging of Zeeland
The Zeeland and South Holland province dikes were not designed to hold the high water levels experienced during the North Sea Storm of 1953 when sea levels crested at up to 12-15 feet above Normal Amsterdam Water Level. At about 3 a.m. on February 1, 1953, the first dikes broke through. The tide rushed to cover between 700 and 1,200 square miles in six hours (the estimates vary; the entire square mileage of the Netherlands is about 16,000). People awoke to thunderous noise and rushed to their rooftops. Just a few people saw the water coming and found a high spot before it reached them. Most people and livestock caught in the open drowned in the advancing flood. The names of about 1,835 flood victims are listed at: http://www.zeeuwsarchief.nl/strijdtegenhetwater/ramp/slachtoffers-lijst.htm; accessed January 11, 2006). Some 3,000 houses and 300 farms were destroyed and 40,000 homes and 3,000 farms were heavily damaged. Approximately 70,000 people required evacuation.

Saving South and North Holland
After Zeeland and the southern part of South Holland were more or less submerged, the flood waters rushed against a dike known as the “Schlielandse Hoge Zeedijk” along the river “Hollandse IJsell”, which was all that remained to protect three million sleeping people in the still-dry Rotterdam and farther north in the province of North Holland. (See map).

A section of the Schlielandse Hoge Zeedijk is known as the “Groenendijk”. It was not reinforced with stone. Many men in the middle of the storm worked feverishly to strengthen the wall but the Groenendijk collapsed anyway at 5:30 a.m. In a desperate move, the Major of Nieuwerkerk confiscated the river ship known as the “The Two Brothers” and commanded the owner to close the hole in the Groenendijk by navigating into it. Afraid that the ship might break through and dive through the breach, Captain Arie Evegroen took a rowing boat with him. The ship turned like a floodgate and locked itself into the dike, thereby saving most of South Holland and all of North Holland from the flood waters. This is a true story. For more on the location of Groenendijk, please see SEMP Biot 318 at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_318.html.

Evacuation
“On the morning of February 1st, the tide was finally able to retreat and the water level dropped. Some people seized the opportunity to move to higher areas, while others continued to take refuge on the roofs of their houses. There were individual rescue operations taking place. Villagers in boats were looking for victims and helping them get to higher land. The severity of the situation was still not known to the outside world, due to the lost road connections [and failed radio and telephone communications]. It therefore took a while before large-scale rescue operations got under way.” (3)
The consequences of the flood were stunning. Approximately 72,000 people required emergent evacuation and almost 2,000 people died as a direct consequence of the flood (there were 846 casualties in Zeeland, 677 in South Holland, and 254 in other provinces). Approximately 200,000 cows, horses, and pigs died in the water. In six hours, the flooding submerged about 1,250 square miles (of 16,000 square miles in the Netherlands). Salt water contaminated the soil rendering it unusable for agriculture for many years. Three thousand houses and 300 farms were destroyed and another 40,000 houses and 3,000 farms damaged.
In South-Holland, dikes were damaged over a distance of 56 miles and there were breaches over a distance of 11 miles. The breaches had a combined total length of 0.62 miles. In Zeeland, the breaches were nearly 2 miles wide and 24 miles of dike was damaged.
Rescue
On Monday, February 2, 1953, large-scale relief slowly got under way and the severity of the situation became clear. Overflights by helicopters began to drop supplies and sand bags to evacuees. England, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and France sent materials and soldiers. The first evacuations began.
On February 3rd the storm had cleared and there were no more casualties although some people still awaited rescue from their roofs and elsewhere. Within a few days, the evacuations of the flooded and dangerous areas were completed and people were able to start inspecting the damage and begin restoring the dikes. (3) The first news about the storm is available in a chilling online video dating from February 2, 1953, at http://www.deltawerken.com/Rescue-and-consequences/309.html.
Recovery
The flood disaster of 1953 led to action on the condition of the dikes. On February 4, 1953, the prime minister announced the formation of the “Delta Committee”, which, in August 1953, gave its advice for the prioritization of the restoration of the levee system: the dike of Schouwen and the moveable storm surge barrier in the Holland IJsell. Meanwhile, volunteers and dike workers worked to close the gaps in the dikes. Within a week, 30,000 volunteers had registered to help repair the dikes. The Ministry of Waterways and Public Works led the restoration works, which was financed by the government (see Biot 318 at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_318.html).
Sources:
1. “Before the Flood of 1953” at “Deltawerken.com”. Available at: http://www.deltawerken.com/Before-the-flood-of-1953/90.html; accessed January 11, 2006.
2. “The Devastating Power of the Sea” at “Deltawerken.com”. Available at: http://www.deltawerken.com/Devastating-Powers/484.html; accessed January 11, 2006.
3. “Rescue and consequences” at “Deltawerken.com”. Available at: http://www.deltawerken.com/Rescue-and-consequences/309.html.