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Fort Hood (TX, USA) Military Base Murders (11/05/09): First U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee Hearing
The following is a transcript of the “The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment” hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs at 10 AM in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on November 19, 2009. U.S. Senator Lieberman (Independent-Connecticut) chaired the Committee. The length of the hearing was 161 minutes. Bolding below is by MRO. Italicized words represent inflection in the speaker’s voice. The original video by the U.S. Senate was available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=70b4e9b6-d2af-4290-b9fd-7a466a0a86b6, as of the transcription date. ****************************************************************************** Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut): The hearing will come to order. This morning our Committee begins an investigation as serious and consequential as any it has ever undertaken. An American soldier, Nadal Hasan, has been charged with killing twelve of his fellow soldiers and one civilian on an American military base in Texas in what I believe based on available evidence was a terrorist attack.
The purpose of this Committee’s investigation is to determine whether that attack could have been prevented, whether the federal agencies and employees involved missed signals or failed to connect dots in a way that enabled Nadal Hasan to carry out his deadly attack. If we find such errors or negligence, we will make recommendations to guarantee the best we can that they never occur again. That is our purpose here. We are conducting this investigation because we believe it is our responsibility to do so according to law and Senate rules. We are both the Homeland Security Committee and over the long term, the Governmental Affairs Committee, which under the rules has a special responsibility to conduct oversight of Executive Branch actions, particularly when, as in this case, there are questions about those actions. We know it will be very difficult for our committee to fulfill our Committee’s responsibility without the cooperation of the Executive Branch.
Yesterday, I want to report, I spoke with Secretary of Defense [Robert] Gates and Attorney General [Eric] Holder and asked their cooperation in allowing the bipartisan staff of this Committee to interview relevant individuals in their departments and obtain relevant documents as part of this investigation of the murders at Fort Hood. Secretary Gates and Attorney General Holder both said they respected our authority to conduct such an investigation and wanted to work out an understanding in which they could cooperate so long as our investigation did not hamper or compromise the criminal investigation and prosecution of the accused murderer Nadal Hasan. I assured them that our Committee understood the difference between their criminal investigation and our Congressional investigation. Their criminal investigation is to bring an accused to justice. Our Congressional investigation is to learn whether the federal government or any of its employees could have acted in a way that would have prevented these murders from occurring. Their investigation in one sense looks backward and is punitive; ours looks forward and is preventive. I am optimistic that we can work out a way for both investigations to proceed without compromising either. Our staffs will be meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice and Defense very soon to try to work out ground rules for both investigations without interfering with each other. But I can say I am encouraged and appreciative that Senator Collins and I and our top staff have received one classified briefing on the Hasan case and will soon receive another and have been given access to some very relevant classified documents relating to this matter. So, we’re off to a good cooperative start. And we’re going to be insistent about this, because it is our responsibility to do so.
At the completion of our investigation, we will issue a report and recommendations. I want to make clear this morning that we intend to carry out this investigation with respect for the thousands of Muslim-Americans who are serving in the American military with honor and the millions of other patriotic law abiding Muslims who live in our country. But we do no favor to all our fellow Americans who are Muslim by ignoring real evidence that a small number of their community have in fact become violent Islamists and extremists. It seems to me here at the outset and based on what we know now that there are three basic areas of importance in which our Committee during this investigation will want to gather facts and draw conclusions. First, as it seems to be the case, there were colleagues of Nadal Hasan in the U.S. Army who heard him say things or watched him do things that raised concerns in their minds about his mental stability and/or his political extremism. The question is were those concerns relayed up the chain of command and were they recorded anywhere in Hasan’s personnel files and did the Army do anything in response to those concerns? Second, what information did the Joint Terrorism Task Forces headed by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] have about Hasan, including transcripts of emails, which he had with a subject of investigation that the FBI acknowledged publicly it had in its possession? [The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is a partnership between the FBI; other federal agencies, notably Department of Homeland Security components such as U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Secret Service, as well as the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service; state and local law enforcement; and specialized agencies, such as railroad police that are charged with taking action against terrorism.] The acknowledgment came last week. What judgments were made about those emails? Was any attempt made to investigate Hasan further after his email traffic with the subject of an ongoing Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation was intercepted? And third, was the information that the Joint Terrorism Task Force had on Hasan shared with anyone in the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or anyone else in our Government? Those to me are three central questions, though by no means all the questions, we will pursue painstakingly and answer as completely as we can before we reach conclusions and make recommendations. This morning, we are really grateful to have with us, to help us consider those questions and others, a very experienced and thoughtful panel of witnesses, with experience in terrorism, counter-terrorism, law enforcement, the military. We have asked our witnesses to give us their first reactions to what we know of the murders at Fort Hood and to what we know of the accused murderer Nadal Hasan, based on the publicly available evidence. I also hope that they will offer us their advice about what other questions our investigation should raise regarding the focus of our inquiry, which is the conduct of employees of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense or other federal agency or department. I really want to thank the witnesses for being here and look forward to your testimony that I am confident will get this Committee’s investigation off to exactly the right start. Senator Collins. Senator Susan Collins (Ranking Republican, R-Maine): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me begin with this morning by saluting you for your leadership and for your courage in proceeding with this investigation and these hearings. I can think of no more important task for this Committee to undertake. Investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorists attack, the Commission led by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton [National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (1)] discovered vital information scattered throughout the government confined by agency silos that might have prevented the death and destruction of that terrible day if only the dots had been connected. In the wake of the mass murder at Fort Hood we once again must confront a troubling question: Was this another failure to connect the dots? Much has been done since 9/11/2001 to respond to the failures exposed by those attacks. We created the National Counterterrorism Center [2], additional Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and fusion centers. We revised information sharing policies and promoted greater cooperation among intelligence agencies and law enforcement. And the results have been significant. Terrorist plots both at home and abroad have been thwarted. The recent arrest of Najibullah Zazi [3] demonstrates the benefits, the tremendous benefits, of information sharing and joint efforts by the NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] and other intelligence agencies, as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement. But the shootings at Fort Hood may indicate that communications failures and poor judgment calls can defeat the systems intended to ensure that vital information is shared to protect our country and its citizens. This case also raises questions about whether or not restricted rules have achieved the legitimate dissemination of information making it too difficult to connect the dots that would have allowed a clear picture of the threat to emerge [see Frances Townsend testimony below]. These are the overarching questions that we will explore with our expert witnesses today. Our ongoing investigation will also seek answers to questions specific to the Fort Hood case. For example, how did our intelligence community and law enforcement agencies handle interceptive communications between Major Hasan and a radical cleric who was a known Al Qaida associate? Did they contact anyone in Major Hasan’s chain of command to relay concerns? Did they seek to interview Major Hasan himself? When Major Hasan reportedly began to openly question the oath that he had taken to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, did anyone in his military chain of command intervene? When Major Hasan in his presentation at Walter Reed in 2007 recommended that the Department of Defense allow “Muslim soldiers the option of being released as conscientious objectors to increase troop morale and decrease adverse events,” did his colleagues and superior officers view this statement as a red flag? Were numerous warning signs ignored because the Army faces a severe shortage of psychiatrists and because the Army was concerned, as the Chief of Staff has subsequently put it, about a backlash against Muslim soldiers? These are all troubling questions we will seek to answer. For nearly four years, this Committee has been investigating the threat of homegrown terrorism. We have explored radicalization in our prisons, the cycle of violent radicalization, and how the Internet can act as a virtual terrorist training camp. We have warned that individuals within the United States can be inspired by Al Qaeda violent ideology to plan and execute attacks even if they do not receive any direct orders from Al Qaeda to do so. And we have learned of the difficulty of detecting “lone wolf” terrorists. To prevent future homegrown terrorist attacks, we must better understand why law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and our military personnel system may have failed in this case. Major Hasan’s attack targeted innocent civilians and soldiers regardless of their religious faith. The patriotic soldiers and citizens of all faiths that were injured and killed not on a foreign battleground but rather what should have been safe and secure American territory deserve a thorough investigation. With so many questions still swirling around this heinous attack, it is important for our nation to understand what happened so that we may work to prevent future incidents. We owe that to our troops, to their families and communities and to all the American people. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you very much Senator Collins for that excellent opening statement. We’ll now go to the witnesses and begin with Jack Keane, retired general of the U.S. Army, former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army. We are honored to have you here, a decorated American soldier and with particularly relevant experience here that I hope General Keane will testify to. He was commander of the base at Fort Bragg during a time or right after, perhaps, when a soldier with white extremist views was involved in the murder of an African-American couple. That experience I think informs his view of this incident and of course we welcome his reflections on that and his broader view of extremism in the military and how we hope the Army has handled this situation. General, it is a great honor to have you here and we welcome your testimony at this time. General Keane: Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee. I truly appreciate your inviting me to testify here this morning on a subject of such national importance which directly affects the security of the American people and in this case equally and more important, our soldiers and their families. How painfully and devastatingly ironic that our soldiers were gunned down at Fort Hood while preparing to deploy overseas to fight jihadist extremists! As we are rapidly becoming aware, the preliminary report suggests that Major Hasan himself is a jihadist extremist, as he indicated during the act of shooting our soldiers by crying out the jihadist refrain “Allahu Akbar.” It appears likely that Major Hasan’s targets and his radical beliefs are directly related as he chose to kill those who were destined to fight jihadist extremism.
We all welcome the investigations the Army, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other agencies of government and this Congress are conducting to determine who was Major Hasan? What were the patterns of his behavior and attitudes? What did we know about what appears to be his extremist beliefs? How did we share that information and what actions did we take or fail to take as a result? And most definitely, what must we do to prevent such incidents in the future? The Department of Defense has a long-standing policy of intolerance for organizations, practices or activities that are discriminatory or extremist in nature. This policy was updated in 1986 as a result of service member participation in supremist activities, and again in 1996 after two Army soldiers committed two racially motivated murders at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, resulting in the death of two African Americans and prompting a DOD [Department of Defense] review of the 1986 policy and a subsequent revision in 1996. In fact, the Army issued a pamphlet titled “Extremist Activities” as a result of that incident. (4) I took command of Fort Bragg and 18th Airborne Corps weeks after that incident occurred and there was much that we learned that eventually became Army policy. First and foremost, we were tolerating racially motivated pinheads who were in our units in Fort Bragg. When extremism occurs in a unit, there is a natural tendency for soldiers to pull away from it, because it is so disturbing to their beliefs and the beliefs of the Army. As such, it can often polarize a unit and directly affect its cohesion, morale, and capability to perform at a very high standard. What we found at Fort Bragg is that our policies were not clear in identifying what extremist behavior was, in this case, tattoos, specific dress, rhetoric, Nazi symbols, etc. As a result, racial extremists were allowed to exist in our units. Twenty-one soldiers were eventually eliminated from the service for exhibiting such behavior, unfortunately all after the racially motivated murders were committed. Two soldiers were tried and convicted for these murders. The Army investigation determined that we needed to update our policies and equally important educate Army soldiers and leaders on the patterns behaviors, signs and symbols of racially motivated extremism. Those policies require soldiers and leaders to identify such behavior and to report it so that commanders can take appropriate action. Commanders’ options are numerous, from counseling, efficiency reporting, UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] or legal actions, and involuntary separation. Our commanders then and now have full authority by Army policy to “prohibit military personnel from engaging in or participating in activities that the commander determines will adversely affect good order and discipline.” I suspect strongly that after we conduct these investigations we will find that our policies will need revision again to account for the specific behavior and attitudes expressed by radical Islamists or jihadist extremists. It should not be an act of moral courage for a soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is displaying extremist misbehavior. It should be an obligation. And as such, the commanders need specific guidelines as to what extremist jihadist behavior is and re-emphasize the need to use the many options they have at their disposal to curb the behavior, to rehabilitate soldiers if possible to take legal or separation action. Because jihadist extremists are potentially linked to organizations that directly affect the security of the United States, it is essential that our government agencies are sharing information about such individuals. What has been in the media these last days about Major Hasan and his behavior, if determined to be true, is very disturbing. Such allegations as justifying suicide bombing on the Internet, lecturing fellow soldiers using jihadist rhetoric, warning about adverse events if Muslims were not allowed to leave military service, repeatedly seeking counsel from a radical Islamist imam Anwar al-Aulaqi with well known ties to Al Qaeda (5), attempting to convert some of his patients who were suffering from stress disorders to his distorted view of Islam, and finally, was the FBI telling the Army what it knew about Hasan and was the Army sharing what it knew about Hasan with the FBI. As these patterns are preliminary, and will be confirmed by the investigations that are being conducted, it is very similar to what we experienced at Fort Bragg in the late 1990s where we were wrongfully tolerating extremists in our organization who had displayed a pattern of behavior that put them at odds with the values and the character of the Army. Let me conclude by saying that the incident and Major Hasan’s behavior is not about Muslims and their religion, which are part of the fabric of American life, respected and assimilated into every aspect of American society, nor is about the 10,000 Muslims in the military who, quite frankly, are not seen as Muslims, but as soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Their contribution, their commitment, and their sacrifice is not only appreciated but it is honored. This is fundamentally about jihadist extremism, which is at odds with the values of America and its military and threatens the safety and security of the American people. I was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and felt up close the horror of this extremism as the Army lost more soldiers and civilians that day than any day in the last eight years of war. I know our soldiers and their families at Fort Hood are stung by this tragedy because their friends and loved ones were killed simply because who they are, what they stand for. They were committed to defend this nation against the very extremism that killed them. Radical Islam and jihadist extremism is the most transformational issue that I have dealt with in my military service and continues to be so today. In my judgment it is the most significant threat to the security of the American people that I have faced in my lifetime. We are a society that espouses tolerance and values diversity and our military reflects those values. But at the same time, we must know what a threat looks like and we must know what to do about it. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you, General Keane, for that clear, strong, principled, for myself, stirring statement. I appreciate it very much. We’re honored to have next Fran Townsend with us, former assistant to [President George W. Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism]. We’re really grateful to have you here to put this case into the context of your experience in counterterrorism. Please proceed. Frances Townsend: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Collins, thank you. It’s really a privilege to be here for you today. You know, after twenty years in the government, most of it as a prosecutor and a Justice Department lawyer, the one thing I think we know for sure is that things always look clearer looking back than when you are in the heat of battle. As you well understand, I caution the American people to remember that imperfect knowledge and facts in the heat of the battle, in the heat of the investigation, often result in less than perfect judgments and less than perfect knowledge. I applaud the effort of the Committee to understand: How can we make that knowledge in the heat of the investigation better so that we can ensure better judgments and better action?
I can say that I have conducted many such reviews during my time in government. Probably the most well known publicly was the Katrina Lessons Learned. What I have found more often than not is that in the wake of a national tragedy, while we typically look for single points of failure, the failures tend to be systemic. They are systemic weaknesses and systemic failures; thus, the importance of your work in identifying those so that we can fix them. When we look at this particular incident I, as others I think, without knowing all of the facts, come away with many, many questions. I break them down into three distinct areas. First, collection; second, law enforcement and the JTTF investigation, and third, the military. Let me start with collection. While we must rely at the moment on public report, what we understand is that there were lawfully intercepted communications in an unrelated terrorism investigation and that as a result of that unrelated investigation, the intelligence community identified less than two dozen communications culled from this unrelated investigation that had more than 20,000 communications. I must say to you that that is an extraordinary accomplishment on the part of the FBI and would not likely have occurred prior to September 11. We must acknowledge what that suggests, and that is a stronger more capable FBI determined to protect us and that is to be commended. Second, I look at the law enforcement and the JTTF investigation. To evaluate that is difficult without understanding several things: first, the content of the investigations they were looking at. They were classified and the subject of an ongoing investigation. Second, when the JTTF investigators looked at those communications, what did they look at them against, what information did they have access to at the time they evaluated those communications? And third, once they had that information at the JTTF and they made a judgment, whether we ultimately agree with the judgments made there or not, what did they do to share that information with individuals who could have taken action outside of a law enforcement context, presumably the United States military. Let me start with content, and while I cannot speak to the content of Major Hasan’s communications, here is what we do know about [radical Islamist imam] al-Aulaqi from the 9/11 Commission Report. Al-Aulaqi in late 2000 was an imam in San Diego where also at that same mosque were two of the 9/11 hijackers. In 2001 al-Aulaqi relocates to the Dar al-Hijra mosque in northern Virginia, the same mosque as the two 9/11 hijackers from San Diego to in northern Virginia, as well as a third hijacker. And finally, al-Aulaqi’s phone number is discovered in Ramsi Binalshibh’s Hamburg apartment as a result of the search that is conducted. The FBI and the counterterrorism community know al-Aulaqi well. He has been the subject of interest and investigation since before and after he left the United States in 2002. He is well known to the international counterterrorism community and to the Yemeni government. Certainly the information regarding what we knew about al-Aulaqi as well as these communications were shared on the JTTF. Certainly the Defense Criminal Investigative Service [6] was a part of that review and participated. Presumably they looked at Major Hasan’s personnel file. Of course, the question remains, what was in that file? All of the things that General Keane articulated, were they there, were they considered? Frankly, based on the judgment that was made on the JTTF, it raises some question about whether any of that information, negative and derogatory, made it into the personnel file that the JTTF had access to. If it was not there, we must ask ourselves why and ensure that that information is in there so that JTTF investigators could have had access to it. Now, once that information was shared among the JTTF and they made a judgment, what happened next? What information was shared? I can tell you from my experience in the Justice Department, depending on how that information was collected will dictate what rules apply in terms of information sharing. There are two sets of rules that apply to Senator Collins’ question, these can be complicated, perhaps unnecessarily so. If the information in those emails or those communications were collected pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA, (7)] typically the warrant that permitted that collection would restrict the further dissemination of that information that was collected without the permission of the court. It is not difficult. One can go back to the court and request the information and get permission for sharing. In fact, in my experience, I couldn’t remember a time when the court didn’t grant such permission. So that’s a legal restriction on the sharing. The second set of rules is a Memorandum of Understanding that the FBI enters into with each agency that participates in the JTTF. [8] The essence of those agreements say that the information by participants in the JTTF is not to be shared with their home agencies without the permission of the JTTF, presumably that’s the FBI by whom they are led. Again, that information, approval, that process can be gotten, there is not a reason not to have it. I will tell you as I thought about this case, as you read the press accounts, the question becomes did DOD ask for that information to be shared? Did the DOD representative on the JTTF ask that that information to be shared back with the Army? Of course we need to know the answer to that question. But I will tell you there is something that offends me about suggesting that the obligation was only on the part of the Department of Defense. Certainly any law enforcement investigator there, if they felt that they did not have the authority to proceed but another federal agency could, whether it was on personnel or other reasons, [they] should have suggested that that information be shared. In the end, why was Major Hasan the information about him from his colleagues at Walter Reed. Excuse me. In the wake of the review, the information and the evaluation of the JTTF—when they made that evaluation, did they interview Major Hasan? If they didn’t believe him to be a threat, if they believed the communications to be legitimate, then why didn’t you go and interview him? If you didn’t want to interview him, why didn’t you go and interview his colleagues at Walter Reed where information that was not in the file might have been discovered? There are three typical responses to those questions. First: the protection of sources and method, that they wouldn’t have wanted to reveal where they got those communications. I would suggest to the Committee that there are ways around that concern to mask the source and methods by which you did that collection. Second: Regrettably, I worry about a sense of political correctness in a post-9/11 world, because we very much respect and rely on the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims and we have done tremendous cultural training inside the federal government and law enforcement agencies, that there might have been some sort of self-censoring, if you will, a reluctance to pursue a senior uniformed military officer, a doctor who was Muslim. Lastly, there is the FBI’s Domestic Operational Guidelines. They were written in December of 2008, they are updated annually, and it has been suggested that they would not have gone out to interview Major Hasan or his employers because they would have been discouraged from doing that by the FBI’s own guidelines. (9) It needs to be looked at and considered and whether or not that needs to be changed. Lastly [sic], when we look at the military, we must look at this important aspect. As I have suggested we have to know whether or not there was a method by which the derogatory information made its way into Major Hasan’s personnel file. If it did, who was responsible and accountable for following up on the information before the intercepts and after the intercepts, if they had gotten the information? We must ensure that even if the military had gotten the information that would have been required, that they have the process and procedures in place to ensure that that not fall through the cracks. They must also have adequate resources and training within the military to be able to address this issue. It’s important not simply because you may want to weed out someone who is mentally incompetent to be deployed, but after all, we want to make sure that the military has adequate resources to root out within their ranks potential criminal, spy, or terrorist. As Senator Collins says, it is important that we assure ourselves, we address these issues, because it is at the core of our obligation to protect our military service members and their families. We ask much of them. We owe them an honest look. We owe them to redouble our efforts to ensure their safety and their security. It is easy to offer questions and opinions when we are unburdened by the facts, and I am not here to second guess the hardworking public servants who investigated this case, but to offer based on my experience how we might improve the system to better protect our men and women in uniform. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman: Thanks, Frances Townsend. I really appreciate your spirit and the content of your testimony that will both be informative and very helpful as we go forward with the investigation. Thanks for bringing your experience to bear. The next witness, we thank him for flying down from New York, who is [Director of Intelligence Analysis, New York City Police Department]. Mr. Silber testified before the Committee before about what I would call a seminal report that he co-authored for the NYPD, which was entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. The NYPD has really quite a remarkable preventive approach, understandably I suppose when one considers what happened on 9/11/01 to the problem of terrorism generally, including a focus on homegrown terrorism. We are really grateful, Mr. Silber, that you have returned to the Committee and we welcome your testimony at this time. Mr. Mitchell Silber: Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me as a representative of the New York Police Department to testify here today. In October of 2007, as you mentioned, I testified before this committee about the findings of a recent study titled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” that I had co-authored and the NYPD had published concerning the process of radicalization in the West and the threat that it potentially posed to the United States. As it has elsewhere, this threat has now materialized in the United States.
During the last twelve months, U.S. authorities have uncovered a number of radicalized clusters of individuals intent on committing violent jihad within the continental United States as well as abroad. These arrests, along with intelligence operations, indicate that radicalization to violence is taking place in the United States. Approximately one year ago, in November of 2008, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI issued a warning related to an al Qaeda linked terrorist plot against the Long Island Railroad commuter network. (10) The origins of this plot link directly to Bryant Neal Vinas, a New Yorker, who radicalized to violence in and around New York City before traveling to Pakistan to seek out an opportunity to participate in violent jihad. (11) In April of 2009, before their arrest by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, four men placed what they believed was C4 explosives outside a Jewish synagogue and community center in Riverdale [New York] in an attempt to carry out a terrorist act. These men were radicalized in the United States. In July of 2009, seven men were arrested by federal authorities in North Carolina. They possessed weapons and more than 27,000 rounds of ammunition and had plans to attack the Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia. These men, known as the Raleigh 7, were inspired by al Qaeda and radicalized in the United States. This September past [2009], Najibullah Zazi, age 24, was arrested as part of an al Qaeda linked conspiracy to attack locations in New York City with hydrogen peroxide based explosives. The plot has been called one of the most serious since 9/11. Zazi, who lived in Flushing, Queens during his formative years – ages 14 to 23—before departing for Pakistan, radicalized in the United States. Later that same September [2009] Betim Kaziu, a 21-year-old New Yorker from Brooklyn, was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder abroad and support for foreign terrorists. Arrested in Kosovo, Kaziu sought to join a foreign fighter group overseas and to “take up arms against perceived enemies of Islam,” meaning American troops, potentially in Iraq or in Afghanistan. He was radicalized in the United States. And there are more: In Boston, Tarek Mehanna, age 26 and a graduate of the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy was arrested last month. Not only did he seek to fight abroad, but he also is charged with conspiring to attack civilians at a shopping mall in the U.S., as well as two members of the executive branch of the federal government. He was radicalized in the United States. At least fifteen men of Somali descent have radicalized in Minneapolis over the last few years and left the U.S. to fight in Somalia. They joined al Shabaab, a terrorist group associated with al Qaeda, based in Somalia. Our fear is -- What happens when they return to the United States? Australia has already thwarted a plot just this year involving individuals who fought alongside al Shabaab and then returned to Melbourne seeking to attack an Australian military base. This past September [2009] also saw two plots involving lone wolves in both Dallas, Texas and Springfield, Illinois. In Dallas, a large office building was targeted with a vehicle borne explosive. In, Springfield, a Federal building was targeted. Although these individuals were not part of any group, much of their radicalization seems U.S. based. Finally, there were recent arrests of two Chicagoans with direct links to Lashkar-e-Toiba, the group responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. Though these men seemed to be plotting against targets in Denmark, once again, it appears that these individuals were radicalized in the United States. Given the evidence of the past twelve-month period, one must conclude that radicalization to violence is occurring in the U.S. Given what seems to be a pattern of individuals radicalizing to al Qaeda inspired violence, the NYPD has invested a substantial analytic effort in order to assess the causes and process that marked the radicalization trajectory of these individuals. Among the cases previously mentioned, we saw the pattern repeating itself. It is consistent with model from the 2007 NYPD report that suggested four phases -- Pre-Radicalization, Self Identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization. Driving this process is a combination of the proliferation of al Qaeda ideology intertwined with the real or perceived political grievances that cite a Western “war against Islam” and provide the justification for young men with unremarkable backgrounds to pursue violent extremism. Let me describe in further detail the four phases: Phase 1: Pre-Radicalization: Pre-Radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology. Based on the cases, individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization tend to be male Muslims, between the ages of 15 to 35 who are local residents and citizens from varied ethnic backgrounds. Significant proportions come from middle class backgrounds and are educated, at least high school graduates, if not university students. Based on our case studies, the vast majority of individuals who end up radicalizing to violence do not start out as religiously observant or knowledgeable. Phase 2: Self-Identification: Self-Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore more literal interpretations of Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with and adopt this ideology as their own. The trigger for this “religious seeking” is often a catalytic event, or crisis, which challenges the individual’s previously held beliefs and causes that individual to reconsider their previously held outlook and worldview. Phase 3: Indoctrination: Indoctrination is the phase in which he intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts extremist ideology and concludes, without question, that action is required to support and further the cause. That action is violence. This indoctrination is the manifestation of accepting a religious-political ideology that justifies, legitimizes, and encourages violence against anything kufr, or un-Islam including the West, its citizens, its allies, or those whose opinions are contrary to their own extremist agenda. The signatures associated with this phase include becoming an active participant in a group and simultaneously become increasingly isolated from one’s former life. Gradually, individuals begin to isolate themselves from secular society and self-radicalize. They come to believe that the world is divided between enlightened believers (themselves) and infidels (everybody else). Phase 4: Jihadization, or the “Violence Phase”: Jihadization is a phase in which individuals accept their individual duty to participate in violent jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Often, individuals will seek to travel abroad to participate in a field of jihad such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Somalia or Iraq, only to be re-directed back to the West to do “something for the cause.” Frequently, group members participate in outdoors activities like rafting, camping or paintball for the purpose of vetting, bonding and training. In addition, mental preparation occurs as jihadist videos are watched. Lastly, potential targets are chosen, surveillance and reconnaissance begin and the group weaponizes with readily available components. While much of the 2007 Radicalization study remains directly applicable to the last twelve months’ events, additional research has highlighted some new findings. The most important is that the internet has become an even more important venue and driver for radicalization. In fact, this finding was also highlighted by a 2008 report that this Committee produced, noting accurately that “the use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist extremist groups has expanded the terrorist threat to our homeland. No longer is the threat just from abroad, as was the case with the attacks of September 11, 2001; the threat is now increasingly from within, from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist ideology to plan and execute attacks where they live. One of the primary drivers of this new threat is the use of the Internet to enlist individuals or groups of individuals to join the cause without ever affiliating with a terrorist organization.” In 2007, we discussed the concept of a “spiritual sanctioner,” an individual who provides religious justification for violent political extremists. Within the last six months we have identified a new catalyst for radicalization – what we call the “virtual spiritual sanctioner.” Although he is not the only one, Anwar al Awlaqi, though based in Yemen, is an exemplar of this concept. Both Anwar Al-Awlaqi’s extremist ties as well as his ability to translate literature that promotes violent jihad into English have enabled his widespread radicalizing effect. Not only has Awlaqi been a religious authority cited by the convicted Fort Dix plotters, who were disrupted in a 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, but his tapes were also played for all who attended the Toronto 18’s makeshift training camp, held north of Toronto in the winter of 2005. That group plotted to explode three tons of ammonium nitrate in Toronto in the fall of 2006. Key Judgments. Number 1: In recent years, U.S. authorities have uncovered a significant and increasing number of radicalized clusters or individuals intent on committing violent jihad either in the U.S. or abroad. These arrests confirm that radicalization is taking place in the U.S today. Number 2: It is also noteworthy that in the past year, there have been a half dozen cases of individuals who, instead of traveling abroad to carry out violence, have elected to attempt do it here; this is substantially greater than what we have seen in the past and may reflect an emerging pattern. Number 3: The al Qaeda threat to the U.S. Homeland is no longer limited to al Qaeda Core. Rather, it has decentralized and now consists of three primary elements -- AQ Core, Al Qaeda allies, like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Islamic Jihad Union and others who have begun to target the West and most recently -- the al Qaeda inspired or homegrown threat, that has no operational relationship with AQ Core, but consists of individuals radicalized in the West, who utilize al-Qaeda ideology as their inspiration for action. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Silber. Just two quick comments. The testimony that you gave the summary of, of the various homegrown plots that have formed and stopped in the last year reminds us that though we are in an unconventional war with the Islamic extremists who attacked us 9/11/01, that war has increasingly has come within our borders. It started here officially, though it was coming at us before, on 9/11/01. This pattern of homegrown radicalization is a very significant new trend and one that I want to deal with effectively, since most of these plots except for the lone wolves, the Little Rock case and presumably Hasan, at least what we know of him now, most of the others, which were groups, have been stopped. Second, in the question and answer period, I’m going to ask you to relate this schematic framework of the phases of radicalization to Nadal Hasan based on what you know about him from public sources now. Our next witness is Juan Carlos Zarate, [former deputy to the President and deputy of national security advisor for combating terrorism], and before that, assistant secretary for terrorist financing at [the Department of the Treasury]. He comes to us today as senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thank you very much for being here. Juan Carlos Zarate: Thank you, Chairman Lieberman. Senator Collins, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today about the horrific attacks on November 5, 2009. Mr. Chairman, I have written testimony that I ask be entered in the record. Chairman Lieberman: Without objection, so ordered. Juan Carlos Zarate: Thank you. My testimony today, Mr. Chairman, addresses some of the implications of the Fort Hood attack, including the continued terrorist threats to our military in the United States, the challenges of dealing with the “lone wolf” insider threat, and the increasing problems of radicalization and the threat of Islamic extremism.
The attack at Fort Hood was not only shocking for its lethality, but because an attack against our men and women of the military in our country on a major military base allegedly by an Army officer whose job it was to care for the mental well being of our soldiers….What makes the Fort Hood attack case particularly difficult to assess at this point is there may have been an admixture of motives or factors or motives at play in the alleged perpetrators mind. What makes it a case that appears to have been harder to disrupt is that Major Hasan acted alone in lone wolf fashion and apparently used his medical and academic research to mask his own inner turmoil and attraction to a violent ideology…. Chairman Lieberman: Mr. Zarate, excuse me for interrupting, but if you could come to a close. I actually read your statement last night and it is very good, including the questions you suggest we raise, but we’ve got a number of Committee members here and I know that they will want to get in their questions. Mr. Zarate: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, just let me conclude with a couple of the key questions…[He continues for minutes...finishes.] Chairman Lieberman: [Introduces Brian Michael Jenkins, senior advisor, RAND Corporation, long-time terrorism expert] Mr. Jenkins: [Discusses some 30+ plots since 9/11 and says only 100 individuals have been arrested for terrorist-related crimes. It shows that radical recruitment is occurring and is a concern. However, only a paucity of recruits and attacks have emerged since 9/11 and suggests to Senator Lieberman that it is a mistake to overreact to the Fort Hood slayings. Intelligence and investigation has led to this good result, as well as that overwhelming numbers of American Muslims remain unsympathetic to jihadists, he avers. He concludes that the government will thus face a tiny number of conspiracies by terrorists whose attacks in a free society are always going to be hard to predict and prevent.]
Chairman Lieberman: Thank you very much. Excellent background, excellent context. You’re right. The record shows that the number of Muslims involved in these plots is quite small. Obviously, what is unsettling is that a small number of people can do terrible harm. But is important that that small number in the context of the larger Muslim-American community, which is obviously not a part of this. We’re going to have seven-minute rounds for questions from the Members of the Committee. I want to quickly focus on something about your testimony, Mr. Jenkins. After the murders at Fort Hood, and information began to come out about Dr. Hasan, there was some commentary that this was obviously an unstable person under stress and to some extent, going from that to a willingness to conclude that this was not a jihadist or a terrorist attack. You commented on that in your prepared testimony and I just want to draw you out on it. My conclusion from your testimony is that the existence of mental stress or instability does not mean that the act carried out is not jihadist or terrorist. Mr. Jenkins: Absolutely. These are not mutually exclusive categories. In many cases, we have individuals who are terrorist who were attracted to these extremist ideologies because of their own personal difficulties and discontent. In other words, terrorism does not attract the well adjusted! Often what happens in these cases, you do have individuals who are angry at something and reach out toward some ideology that resonates and re-enforces that and channels them down a path toward a particular action. So, if we say, there are many aspects of Mr. Hasan that are troubling, that this is a man in some type of personal crisis, that clearly does not EXCLUDE his act being properly labeled as an act of terrorism. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. General Keane, I think that Mr. Zarate spoke correctly about the premium that we place on freedom of speech in our country, and where one draws the line between free political expression, even if they are extremists, and actionable behavior of any kind. But, in this case, I think we need to view that, don’t we, in the context of what it means to be in the United States Military and I’m wondering if you can help us understand a bit that, particularly in light of the concerns that Frances Townsend expressed and that we’ve been concerned about, whether some fear of being politically incorrect inhibited earlier action against Dr. Hasan by those who had heard him express extremist views. So, does a soldier have the right to say anything he wants to say without any consequences? General Keane: Absolutely not. Free speech is an integral part of the rights of Americans. But in the United States Military, not too surprisingly, the mission comes first and to be able to perform that mission you need inter-team cohesion, morale, discipline, and good order. And anyone who is contributing to breaking that cohesion, morale, discipline and good order with rhetoric, with speech, with actions, with behavior, can be held accountable by the chain of command for that speech, for that behavior, and therefore be counseled for it, rehabilitated for it, and if there is such an unwillingness to change, such a commitment to those beliefs, then be separated for it, all of this short of any criminal behavior, as some of the panelists have discussed. The military unit cannot function and perform its mission under considerable stress without the necessary cohesion, morale, discipline and good order, and have confidence in each other. When this speech starts to occur, inflammatory speech that aggravates other members of the team, it polarizes the unit, it differentiates people in the unit, it forces them to choose side. And that is where the commanders and supervisors have to step in and start to address this issue. Regardless of people’s sensibilities, the order and discipline and morale takes priority over the sensibilities. That is the requirement of the military and its mission and what the American people hold us accountable for. Chairman Lieberman: General Keane, what then is the responsibility of an individual soldier who hears a fellow soldier express political views that are extremist? In the case in which you were involved at Fort Bragg, they were white supremacist views, what we were obviously concerned about here are Islamist extremist views. What is the responsibility of a soldier to report up the chain of command such observations? General Keane: Yes, the members of the team have an obligation to identify and report to the chain of command any of this extremist type behavior, rhetoric, etc. That was clearly one of the problems we had at Fort Bragg’s units. It was being tolerated by the soldiers and was also being tolerated by the immediate chain of command to a certain degree. It’s unclear in my mind that we have in the military today and in our Army units clear specific guidelines about what is jihadist extremist behavior? How do you quantify this behavior? How does it manifest itself? I think that’s one of the things that this investigation will probably determine as I said in my remarks and I believe that the Department of Defense will more than likely have to issue some very specific guidelines, as we had to do for the racially-motivated murders and the skinhead extremism we had in our midst in the ‘90s [1990s]. Chairman Lieberman: Yes, we will definitely pursue that and that may be an area of recommendation for us. But right now, Army policy about extremism, to the best of your knowledge, is extremism generally prohibited or is it more focused based on the Fort Bragg case on the white supremist activity? General Keane: The Army pamphlet that was published in 2000—it’s entitled Extremist Activities--as a result driven by the Fort Bragg incident deals with racial extremism. Period. That’s its focus. It’s under the general capstone of an Army policy that has a much broader focus than that. But I think the pamphlet was designed to give commanders and the chain of command some specifics in terms of how to deal with this problem, given that particular incident. So, what we are dealing with here now, in my view, dealing with jihadist extremists potentially, and preliminary evidence would suggest that, those kind of guidelines in terms of defining that and how to deal with it in the specific case--that behavior and that attitude and that rhetoric--are not in the hands of our commanders. Chairman Lieberman: If our investigation finds that’s true and I suspect it is, that is a real omission and an area for correction, particularly in light of the record that other witnesses have testified to, of the way in which jihadists or people who self radicalize or radicalize over the Internet, are being exhorted to attack the American military on bases, not just abroad but here at home. My time is up. Thank you, General. Senator Collins. Senator Collins: Thank you. General, let me pick up where the Chairman left off. I have the pamphlet on the Extremist Activities that you just mentioned and I commend you for taking this strong action after the racially motivated murder at Fort Bragg. As I read through this pamphlet, however, the types of conduct prohibited in the policy manual really don’t apply in the case of Major Hasan. Would you agree with that? General Keane: I obviously agree. The pamphlets are in the hierarchy of information provided to our leaders of our units and deals with something very specific as a result of a particular action under the umbrella of a general policy. That’s what that was designed to do. We do not have anything like that dealing with the Hasan incident and his behavior and his attitude and what should be the actions that guide leaders and also guide our soldiers. Senator Collins: That is my conclusion as well. The prohibited activities that are listed in this manual are all geared toward organized activity. They really don’t apply to the lone wolf conduct that we saw with Major Hasan. I agree with the Chairman that this is an area that we need to pursue. Frances Townsend, there has also been discussion this morning and previously about Major Hasan’s First Amendment rights. I want to pursue this issue with you. Both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Attorney General’s Guidelines prohibit collection based solely on, and that’s the important word, solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. And these restrictions were to prevent abuses that occurred in the past where federal intelligence and law enforcement targeted individuals based solely on their political activities. No one wants to see that. I am concerned, however, with reports that our federal law enforcement and counterintelligence agents may have backed off from further inquiries into Major Hasan’s activities based on concerns about his First Amendment right. Do the restrictions in FISA or in the Attorney General’s Guidelines in any way prohibit investigation if there are other reasons to do so? In other words, to give you a specific, wouldn’t the fact that Major Hasan had been in repeated contact with a radical extremist Islamic cleric who was a known associate of al Qaeda terrorists be a reason to pursue an investigation? Francis Townsend: Senator Collins, I agree with you completely. To the extent there would have been concern of infringing on Major Hasan’s either right to free speech or his freedom to practice his religion, there were other factors to which you could point beyond that, not having anything to do with his religion or his of speech that could have caused concern. There were people, while it is not public the content of those communications, certainly those communications and now what we are hearing from his other colleagues up at Walter Reed, any combination of those factors, as long as it was not based solely on his exercise of his constitutional freedoms could have formed the basis of further inquiry and investigation by the FBI. Senator Collins: So, if we are being told that one reason this was not aggressively pursued was concern that it would violate the FISA restrictions or the Attorney General’s Guidelines, you would disagree with that decision, based on what you know? Francis Townsend: What I know now, yes, I would disagree with that. Frankly, Senator, this is why I mentioned my concern about political correctness. I think that we have to ensure that our investigators feel sufficiently backed up, if you will, to follow the facts, wherever they lead them. And if the facts lead them to an investigation of a senior member of the uniformed military who happens to be a Muslim doctor, then that’s where they lead them. But they have to feel confident to pursue the facts wherever they take them against whoever the target may be. Senator Collins: The other very important point that you made in your testimony while the members of the JTTF are prohibited from sharing information with their home agencies, without permission of the FBI, not only can then ask permission, but presumably the FBI could direct a referral to the Army or to the DCIS [Defense Criminal Investigative Service]. Is that correct? It goes in both directions. Francis Townsend: That’s right and I think the best way to explain this to folks is with an example. Imagine that you had an intercept that was not of a federal crime. Perhaps it was a rape, perhaps it was child abuse. Suppose you had that sort of information from over a wiretap in the JTTF and the local police officer didn’t say, Can I share it? Presumably, the Good Lord willing, somebody paying attention on the JTTF would say, This needs to be shared with local authorities either to prosecute a crime or to protect a child as in my example. So absolutely, my view of this is, all members of the JTTF have an obligation when they see information, you don’t just--NYPD has a public program called “See it, Say it.” Certainly, if it passes you, just because it’s not in your jurisdiction or your particular agency, doesn’t relieve you of the fundamental law enforcement obligation to follow it up. Senator Collins: Thank you. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you, Senator Collins. I just want to say very briefly that some years ago we had a case in Connecticut, just as you [Townsend] describe, related to terrorism in which a local official was being for corruption. Wiretaps picked up that this local official was involved in basically sexual abuse of children. It went right up to the Attorney General at that time to determine whether he should be arrested for those acts of abusing the children. The correct judgment was made that the corruption investigation was forgotten and he was arrested and as far as I know he is still in jail for those crimes. As is the custom with this Committee, questions are asked by the order of arrival. Senator Carp. Senator Thomas Carper (D-Delaware): To our witnesses, thank you very, very much for joining us today and for the time that you invested in preparing your testimony for us today. Your testimony has been most illuminating and, I think, most constructive. I turn to the testimony that Mr. Zarate gave us and near the end of your testimony, I didn’t catch it and I tried to find it in your statement, something that a Muslim said, is that right, something like, “We Muslim Americans are the defining answer.” Do you remember that?
Mr. Zarate: That’s right, Sir. Senator Carper: Can you go back and just read us that comment, please. Mr. Zarate: Right. This comment comes from Salam al Marayati, who is the executive director of a group called the Muslim Public Affairs Council. He is based in Southern California. Soon after the Fort Hood attack, he posted on Huffington Post, which is in essence an op-ed. He called the Fort Hood incident “a defining moment for an American Muslims,” which was in essence to “own our own destiny” and “to deal with terrorism in our midst.” [Speaks from his experience with Muslims in past positions, says an important quote is that “Terrorism will be defeated with our work on the frontlines, not in the battlefields, but in our mosques and community centers and youth associations. By standing up and working for change, we are acting on the best and guiding principles of Islam and of America.”] I think that is an incredible statement by Salam, that Muslim Americans have to take ownership of the ideological battle that is happening within Islam itself, to find ways of isolating those who are radicalizing youth and getting into the heads of American citizens. [See note #12 below for full quote.] Senator Thomas Carper: Thank you. Of all the comments that have been given, that one jumped right off the page at me. [Asks each witness to respond to the statement by Salam, of how the Muslim community in American can help to make sure something like this never happens again.] General Keane: Well, my reaction to that is certainly one of encouragement. I certainly praise him [Salam al Marayti] for making those remarks. In the larger context of what we are dealing with in terms of the challenge inside Islam between the radicals and the modernists and the traditionalists who are very much moderates themselves, it’s hard to see defeating radical Islamism itself without the willingness and cooperation of the moderates to reject it. We are going to kill a lot of these radical Islamists over the coming years, just as we have over the last eight years. But as we all know, those of us who have been involved close up in this fight, the reality of the matter is that killing them won’t defeat this movement. It will have to be defeated by moderate Muslims who reject it. Senator Thomas Carper: Frances Townsend. Francis Townsend: As you know, Senator, most Muslim-Americans are patriotic, law abiding citizens and in fact while very few actually speak out, many cooperate quietly with law enforcement and federal law enforcement. We won’t be successful without the continuing and that is to be commended. Oftentimes, moderate Muslims are reluctant to speak out because the radicals label them--the word is [?], which means un-Islamic, and separate them from the [?] of the Muslim world. And it’s very both discouraging to them and frightening to Muslims and it intimidates them from speaking out. We have to understand that that is the environment that they live in. So there are few that have the courage to speak publicly. But we don’t want to discourage them from talking quietly and privately with federal and local officials. Senator Thomas Carper: Mr. Silber. Mitchell Silber: I think your question is what are the ways to combat extremism and what role does the Muslim community plays. We are informed in our discussions with intelligence officials with the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands, they’ve had to deal with this problem in a magnitude greater to date than the United States. Clearly, there response is the same as ours. At the end of the day, it’s going to be members of the Muslim community themselves who have to delegitimize this as an ideology and the challenges for those government and local entities to find willing interlocuters to help them. Senator Carper: Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins: I would underscore what Frances Townsend said, that it is important for Muslims to speak out publicly, but also there is evidence for a great deal of quiet activity going on within the community. We’re talking about people attempting to ensure that their own family members, friends and colleagues do not go down destructive and self-destructive paths. So, there is a great deal of pressure within the community against this type of activity. Senator Carper: [Asks each witness to revisit the legislative things the Committee can do to improve the situation of jihadist terrorism in and outside of the United States.] Mr. Zarate: I would make sure that law enforcement and intelligence authorities have the relevant legal authorities…and resources…to be able to investigate domestically, because, again, what we are talking about…is a very difficult problem to ferret out, especially when you are talking about a lone wolf scenario. One of the issues that will confront the FBI, as there are additional pressures to ferret out these actors and events, do they [FBI] have the resources to cover these types of events…where there may be thousands of communications to follow up on with a figure like Anwar al-Aulaqi in the United States? Frances Townsend: Senator, the two that I would focus on is [first] the information sharing and the rules. Sometimes the rules become so cumbersome that they are discouraging so the investigators don’t do it and I think the Committee has a real opportunity to look at the restrictions pursuant to FISA, the restrictions in the Attorney General’s Guidelines and the restrictions in the FBI’s own internal guidelines. Taken all together, they may have discouraged people from doing what they really needed to do. And the second piece to that it seems that the U.S. military, it doesn’t look like the U.S. Army got the information so that they could act within their system. I wouldn’t stop there. I think we’ve got to look at whether the U.S. military, if they had gotten the information, had the training, tactics, procedures, resources and business process, to ensure that they identify and deal with these things effectively. Senator Carper: Thank you again, very, very much. Chairman Lieberman: Thank you, Senator Carper. Good questions and constructive answers. Senator McCain. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing. I would like to ask the witnesses: Do you believe that the attack on Fort Hood was an act of terror?
General Keane: In my mind, I do, based on the preliminary reports and Major Hasan was screaming “Allahu Akbar” at the time of the act and his behavior and attitude prior to that, just based on the preliminary reports. Certainly, investigations will confirm what his motivations are, but what is in front of us now, I do. Frances Townsend: Senator, when you look at the basic English dictionary definition of terror, which is the use of violence to instill fear and intimidation, I think that it is hard to imagine that this wasn’t an act of terror. I think what remains to be in the investigation is to find out whether this was an individual banked on terrorizing or whether he is part of a larger conspiracy. But I do think that it is an act of terror. Mr. Silber: From the New York City’s Police Department perspective, this is an ongoing investigation being run by other agencies, so we’re not going to pre-judge their findings. Senator McCain: Well, I asked your opinion of the findings. Voice your opinion is fine with me. Mr. Zarate. Mr. Zarate: Senator McCain, it certainly looks like an act of terror. I think the technical definition of U.S. law, the motivation behind the attack is going to be central, obviously, whether you can classify it as such, but I think it looks like an act of terror to me. Senator McCain: Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins: Terrorism is defining the quality of the act. Certainly, the act itself, I think, meets the quality of an act of terrorism. Under a legal definition, in terms of the law, Major Hasan is charged with thirteen counts of murder, and that’s appropriate. We don’t need to reach into the criminal statutes to find the word terrorism to prosecute him. We have him on an ordinary crime. That’s good enough. Senator McCain: Thank you. Let me just briefly review what we do know. We know that Major Hasan had communications with a Yemeni-American imam. We know that the FBI had some knowledge of this and reviewed certain communications between Major Hasan, and the subject of that communication asserted that the content of these communications was consistent with research being conducted by Major Hasan in his position as a psychiatrist at the Walter Reed Medical Center. There are allegations of communications with other extremists, web posting advocating suicide bombing, possibly him, an individual named Nadal Hasan, posted on the website that favorably compared jumping of an American soldier on a grenade to save the lives of his fellow soldiers to suicide bombers, his activities at Walter Reed in which Hasan antagonized some students and faculty espousing what they perceived to be his extremist Islamic views, and of course the most notable of his activities while he was working at Walter Reed was a medical presentation to fellow students where he included statements such as “We love death more than you love life;” “Fighting to establish an Islamic state, please God, even by force,” condoned by Islam. General Keane, obviously this is speculation, the military is most sensitive of any organization that I know of any taint or allegation or impression of being discriminatory, which is appropriate. Do you think that political correctness may have played some role in the fact that these dots were not connected? General Keane: Yes, absolutely. I also think a factor here is Hasan’s position as an officer and his position as a psychiatrist contributed to that because of the special category of someone who is operating as a clinician every day treating patients which is an individual activity versus a group activity. [The latter] provides considerably more supervision in squads, platoons, companies and the like inside our units. So there is no doubt in my mind that that was what was operating here. But in fairness to many of the people who were associated with him, based on what preliminary research I have done and what the Committee is doing, I think we are going to find very clearly that we do not have specific guidelines in dealing with jihadist extremism in terms of the obligations of the members of the military to identify it and report it and what actions to take and what constitutes jihadist extremism itself. So you take some of this burden away from people by having those guidelines. When you have those guidelines in place, you are clearly saying to the institution that this is important to us. We’re not going to tolerate this kind of behavior and we want to identify it immediately to try to curb the behavior through counseling and rehabilitation and if necessary separate that individual from the service if that cannot be curbed. Senator McCain: But I have talked to military officers who stated that they, at least up until now, have had a significant reluctance to pursue what may be these indications because of this political correctness environment. Have you heard the same? General Keane: Well, I know it exists, no doubt about it. What I’m trying to say is that the way to combat that—it shouldn’t have to be moral courage on behalf of a soldier to have to report behavior that we should not be tolerating inside our military organizations. It should be an obligation. The way to make that an obligation is by providing very specific guidelines through the chain of command to what their duties are in regards to this issue. That begins to take that issue off the table, because the institution is speaking clearly in terms of what its expectations are, and what it will tolerate and what it will not tolerate. Senator McCain: And perhaps err on the side of caution instead of erring on the side of correctness. General Keane: Yes, absolutely, Senator. Senator McCain: Dr. [sic] Townsend. Frances Townsend: As I mentioned in my testimony, I have the same concern that you’ve articulated in the U.S. military and in the law enforcement community. We’ve invested lots of time and effort in the post-9/11 world to ensure that people understand we’re going to provide people First Amendment protection and their freedom and practice of religion. I do fear that because this was a senior member of the uniformed military that there was a reluctance to proceed and I think this is an area that the Committee should and ought to investigate and uncover in terms of our law enforcement system that we can’t allow them to be reluctant to follow the facts, just because they’re afraid that they’re going to be criticized for not being politically correct. Senator McCain: Mr. Silber. Mr. Silber: In the NYPD, if we had a concern like that, it would be forwarded up the chain of command as well as to the Department of Internal Affairs for investigation. Senator McCain: Mr. Zarate. Mr. Zarate: Given my experience with the FBI, I don’t think there would have been a sense of political correctness with respect to the ethnicity or the religious beliefs of the individual. I think that his status in the military, the fact that he was a medical doctor, the fact that he was engaged in research into the potential conflicts in the minds of Muslim soldiers, that may have affected the judgment of the FBI in this context and much less a question of his ethnicity or religious beliefs. Senator McCain: But if they believe that those kinds of emails that were detected were part of research, which advocates extreme Muslim activity, at least I’d find out what kind of research was going on. Frankly, I’ve never heard of such research. So, I’m kind of skeptical about your answer. Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins: I don’t think that religion is the basis for any group being stigmatized, but religion provides no shield against any legitimate inquiry and therefore should not have inhibited an appropriate inquiry. Let me, however, underscore a point made by General Keane, which I think is important here. My military training is in combat units. In a combat unit, actions like this, attitudes like this, would be picked up much faster than in the individual professional activity of a psychiatrist, even though in military service. Senator McCain: I thank you, I thank the witnesses. Chairman Lieberman: Thanks Senator McCain. An important I just want to add this: After the Fort Hood massacre, I received a call from a friend of mine who is a high ranking officer in the Army, just to confirm what you [pointing to a witness] said, and basically going to your [pointing to another witness] point, we have a great respect for diversity but it shouldn’t be a cover for bad behavior. And this officer said that if the Army and the rest of the services make clear that Islamist extremist behavior is not tolerated and that you have an obligation to report it right away, we will be doing an enormous favor to all the other Muslim-American soldiers who serve under me because without that, this officer said to me, I worry that the non-Muslim soldiers are going to have hesitation over what we have to have in combat, which is blind trust in one another. So, I think it’s a really important point, that insofar as we focus on the extremists, we are actually going to be doing a favor to everybody else of that particular religion who is in the military and helping military cohesion. [There were 30 more minutes of the hearing that are not transcribed here.]
Notes:
I applaud leaders like Salam al Marayati, Executive Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), who has issued a clarion call to fellow Muslim Americans. In a Huffington Post posting on November 12, 2009, Marayati called Fort Hood a “defining moment for Muslim Americans” to “demonstrate . . . that we are working or America, not merely taking seats on the margins of our society.” His conclusion bears repeating: We have only one option available to deal with ideologically motivated violence: the Islamic theology of life must overcome the cult of death. No more justification for violence against the innocent or the defilement of jihad in order to lead young men and women to their death, while Muslim leaders sit on their hollow thrones. We, as Muslim Americans, are the answer to this frightening phenomenon of terrorism and violent extremism. We own our own destiny, and it is fundamentally intertwined with our nation's destiny. Terrorism will be defeated with our work on the frontlines, not in the battlefields, but in our mosques and community centers and youth associations. By standing up and working for change, we are acting on the best and guiding principles of Islam and of America. |
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