May/Jun 2005 - Volume 4, Issue 3

American Red Cross’ Traditional and Non-Traditional Community Partners:
An Interview with Yvette Maxie

This dialogue occurred between Yvette Maxie, local government liaison for the Greater Chicago Chapter of the American Red Cross, and Margaret O’Leary on May 2, 2005, at Red Cross headquarters in Chicago, and has been edited for publication.

What does Red Cross teach about disaster preparedness?

The Red Cross (http://www.redcross.org/) as a national agency has been around for over a hundred years. We are one of the premier non-governmental agencies that is collaborating with our local, state, and federal authorities to ensure that the American public has as much information as possible and as much access to disaster preparedness information as possible. Disaster preparedness education ranges from creating a family plan to creating a disaster supply kit (which we talk about a lot), to fire, winter storm, and even terrorism safety.

We try to reach out to specific categories of people, such as you and me as individuals, and heads of households, schools, businesses, and communities. We try to provide key points to our audiences that they can follow themselves in whichever environment they are. We provide the information either face-to-face in classroom instruction or provide information via our website.

We find that people are much more attuned to obtaining disaster preparedness information following a disaster. For example, we had many inquiries after the recent tsunami disaster following the earthquake in Indonesia. The possibility of a tsunami coming from Lake Michigan into Chicago caused some people to ask for tsunami preparedness information. Even though hurricanes do not strike Chicago, they are often in the news. People, especially elementary and high school students, call us to obtain more information about hurricane preparedness. People who live in southern Illinois are often interested in earthquake preparedness information because of the New Madrid fault that exists there. The Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the American Red Cross are involved in initiatives to educate people about earthquake preparedness, including personal preparedness and preparing homes and businesses to withstand the effects of an earthquake, particularly if it were to hit close or directly in their area.

What is the most common disaster seen by the American Red Cross of Greater Chicago?

Within the seven counties that our chapter covers, our primary educational focus is fire safety because fires are our most common disaster. Over the past two to three years, we’ve averaged approximately 1,200 disasters per year, and, of that, the majority is single-family or multiple-family fires. When we talk to community groups, schools, churches, any entity that is willing to interact with the Red Cross, we focus on family planning and building a disaster supply kit, but we will invariably stress fire safety.

We try to bring common sense to, and dispel myths about, being prepared in the home. I teach through interactive discussion, which I enjoy. I ask people to look at their own home front. I stress my own common mistakes in the past, such as lit candles with an open window, leaving the hair curlers running after I’ve left for work, and not really knowing whether my iron’s automatic off function is actually working. I get to see how people are enthusiastic about learning and how they incorporate what I say into their home lives.

Do you teach “continuity of operations” emergency planning to businesses?

I teach preparedness classes to a wide variety of groups, including teaching business continuity planning at corporations and smaller businesses to staff members who are looking at how to maintain the functioning of their businesses if an emergency struck them directly. For example, how would a telemarketing firm keep doing business during a massive power outage or if the phones went out? Would they be completely out of business for that short period of time? What if the business’ headquarters was located in Florida and was struck by a hurricane?

What have you learned about how businesses maintain their operations in a disaster?

Quite a few businesses have secondary sites. If they don’t already have a secondary site, they may be looking at partnering with other businesses in the same field or with partners that use the same sort of computer network systems, and together develop a secondary site.

What is the business continuity arrangement for Red Cross of Greater Chicago?

This chapter is really blessed. Keep in mind that we cover seven counties in northeastern Illinois: Cook, Will, DuPage, Kane, Kendall, McHenry and Lake. Within some of these counties we have specific offices. We do not have an office in DuPage, Kane and Kendall counties although there is a Red Cross chapter in Kane County (Fox River Valley Chapter) that is separate from our chapter. But we do have what we call “community facilities” in Mundelein, Arlington Heights, Hillside, Crystal Lake and Romeoville. These community facilities are places where staff can work to provide a certain level of service to suburban communities, such as disaster response, health and safety classes, and blood service. The community facilities are our secondary sites if our headquarters site were to go down.

Does the Chicago Chapter regularly back up its computer data?

Yes, we do. We are very fortunate that our entire network is backed up every day via our national headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. Rather than us being our own separate independent entity, we are part of a national system when it comes to email, etc. Now we, like others, may have issues. For example, just like a doctor needing to heal himself or herself—someone who should know better but have poor health that is preventable—well, the same goes for the Red Cross whereby we know about being prepared—we teach it every day—yet we may have instances here and there that when it comes to continuity of operations we may not be as prepared as people may assume. The same thing is true about the federal government. You would assume that it is prepared because it is certainly good at compiling information and providing data about this and that. Yet if you go to that federal employee or that federal institute and ask whether they have done what they are asking us to do, they invariably have not done so!

Are you involved with Red Cross blood services?

If you are outside of the Red Cross, you may not be aware that the Red Cross is an umbrella organization: blood services comprise one prong and regular Red Cross chapters comprise a separate prong. Our relationship to each other is only that we are under the same name, but as far as direction and control, capacity and limitation, we, in the regular chapters, don’t have information about blood services. I would have to link you up with someone within the blood services department. It’s been going through quite a number of changes since September 11, 2001, and all the things that came about from that—the intense scrutiny, for example. Even though blood services is a separate entity, we recognize that in the event of a disaster, we are still connected. Let me back up for a second.

One of my jobs as government liaison is to make sure before a disaster strikes that our partners--municipal, state and county governments--are aware of our capacities and limitations as a response entity. During 9/11 blood services played its own particular role, which was good and bad at exactly the same time. As government liaison, I need to have answers to the questions about blood services that are going to come my way from local partners. #1: Can the Red Cross be a central intake entity for blood services? #2: What is our current capacity if we were tasked with doing that? Can we do it? Do we have enough resources and people to do that? #3: What would be our sites if we were able to say yes to #1 and #2? Unlike other blood collection agencies, we do NOT have a store front. We do not have our own sites where a person can come to donate blood. The way that we collect blood is by setting up blood drives at corporations, businesses, and schools.

Where then do you store the blood collected at Red Cross blood drives?

There is a central place where we take the blood after we have collected it and do the things that need to be done to it, but we don’t have locations like LifeSource (http://www.lifesource.org/) or Heartland Blood Centers (http://www.heartlandbc.org/). They have fixed site locations where people can go to donate blood. .

Can you describe more about your position and how you came to work at the Red Cross?

My official title with the Red Cross is local government disaster liaison, which is a very long title. My primary focus is upon our disaster services department in regard to establishing and maintaining relationships. My job started out as relating to government entities only. But what I realized is that government entities could not be my only focus because there were community partners that would have as much of a viable role before and after a disaster as our government partners would!

Our government partners are easy because their role is predefined. My relationship with them is to make sure that they are aware of what our role would be in a disaster and how we very much want to work with them prior to a disaster affecting the area to make sure 1) that everyone is educated, 2) that after a disaster occurs to contact us as quickly as possible to get our folks en route as quickly as possible to the site, and 3) that we maintain contact with them if the event is still unfolding or is over, to let them know that this is what the Red Cross is doing. These are some of the needs we may have, for example, if we are sheltering a thousand people or need clearance issues if we cannot gain access to a particular area. The public always turns to the government to find out who’s doing what and who should be doing this or that. We want to make sure that the government is aware of what WE are doing. For example, we let them know these are the folks we are providing services to and these are the types of services we are providing. We update government personnel continuously.

What government entities are you referring to?

I relate primarily to county and municipal-level governments, but I have been branching out to the state legislature as well, which is an interesting aspect. For example, the last indicator meeting that I had to miss was on lobby day for the Red Cross. It was our specified day, which means they knew we were going to come and speak with them on a variety of concerns, issues and topics. As a whole the government liaison at the municipal and county levels is relatively new within the state of Illinois. Each state in the US has a state government relations officer from the Red Cross who interacts with the state legislature or governor. We have one in Illinois and he concentrates on state government matters only.

Then, in your position, you also interact with non-government agencies?

Yes. Even though my position was created to interact with county and municipal government partners, I have branched out on my own to include public health agencies, community agencies, churches—I talk to anyone or anybody who will listen to me. If people, like yourself, invite me to sit down and have discussions and conversations about how everyone fits in the mix, I do it! We’re all in this soup here and there’s different flavors, but if I took each group or individual out of the soup, what is its specific role in whichever type of event occurs?

Dr. Pam Diaz with the Chicago Health Department calls these “other” partners, “non-traditional partners.” Is that how you would characterize them, too?

Exactly. I was sent to New York City September 26 th following 9/11, for a couple of weeks. My primary function at that time was to assist the local chapters in running their regular response. Even as the events of 9/11 were unfolding, there were still house fires and other types of events that were occurring in NY at exactly the same time. One of the things to do during a response in someone else’s territory is to look at how well their people are trained and discover what sort of relationships they have—the traditional and the non-traditional relationships. How effective overall are they, including two or three weeks after the disaster, a month later, three months later? What I realized in NYC is that unless we branch out and try to link together as many people as possible that have their own constituents—I recognize that you will have a certain number of folks, such as public aid recipients, when it comes to a disaster affecting them, that may go directly to Illinois Department of Human Services before they go to the Red Cross simply because they have that link with IDHS! A new immigrant may go to the settlement agency first before going to the Red Cross. That meant to me that I needed to branch out and talk not only to people at the municipal level, such as the mayor or city manager, but also to talk to people at the public health department, the human services agencies, and other organizations to try to make sure that everyone is aware, whether it is a single family incident or another 9/11, of the role of the Red Cross. I want to make sure that traditional and non-traditional entities know how you contact the Red Cross and what they should expect from the Red Cross.

Command center at the American Red Cross, Greater Chicago Chapter.

How long have you been with the Red Cross in Chicago?

I have been in my present position for three years. But I have worked with the Red Cross for 13 years, since I was 22 years old. I started off as a volunteer for four and a half years, then I worked as a dispatcher, and then I was a disaster specialist, which meant I had my own jurisdiction to cover for any kind of response on the South Side of Chicago. The South Side of Chicago area at that time extended from 3900 south to the border of Cook and Will County. It went to west to Harlem and east to Lake Michigan. The South Side of Chicago has the most disasters of any area in the entire state of Illinois, unfortunately. It has a high proportion of minority and/or low economic areas, which makes for a “bad cocktail” when it comes to disasters, including a person’s ability to recover from the disaster, which is severely affected. I went from disaster specialist to my present position. Throughout all my years at the Red Cross, I have worked with municipal and non-traditional partners to make sure they were aware of our role and linking them to other opportunities within the Red Cross. When I speak to anyone, I consider him or her an opportunity. YOU are an opportunity to learn more about the Red Cross and to collaborate with others down the road.

Why did you become a Red Cross volunteer?

I consider it to be a blessing from God. I was standing on a CTA train platform and I saw a sign from the Red Cross that said: “Come volunteer for the Red Cross.” I hadn’t really thought about the Red Cross and really had only heard of it at the time of national disasters. I thought to myself that I should look into this and, as I was thinking this, a Red Cross response vehicle went by on the expressway. That did it. I contacted the Red Cross. It took awhile to get in and start my training and classes. But I was bitten by the bug.

One of the great things about being a disaster action volunteer, which is what we call it, is that you are able to affect change in a person’s life. You respond to a person or a family during a disaster, you work with this family to get them to trust you, and you become a calming influence in events where there may be loss of property and loss of life. You provide that calming influence. The family understands that I am there to help, not to take anything from them, but to provide—when they’re ready for it. It’s the ability to provide that family with shelter and clothing, and helping them get back on their feet. Being a volunteer, being able to a positive force in regards to putting people back on their feet, giving them that sense of hope that even though right now the situation may not look good or the situation looks really bad in regards to potential life, there IS an agency that is here at 2 am when you need us and we will provide a safe environment for you and your family so that you are able to sit down and think for a moment. That’s the thing that really hooked me with the Red Cross—being able to do that for people and being able to go home at night and feel that I really helped those people in those three or four house fires. Were it not for me, and for me, if there wasn’t the Red Cross, who would have been there to provide the people with that level of service?

In our work with municipalities, some have many resources and some are poor. Some municipalities do not have a clearly established human services department and, if it were not for the Red Cross, people affected by a disaster would not receive any shelter or food. In these situations, I and other volunteers are acutely aware that these people would have nothing except what we are able to provide. The Red Cross is a 24-hour entity and we want people to call us at 2 am when they have needs.

Red Cross is expert in providing “mass care.” Can you please elaborate?

The American Red Cross is the only non-governmental agency that has a designated role in the National Response Plan (http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/asp/HS_inIowa/NRP%20final%20%20Draft%20June-30-04.pdf) within the Emergency Services Function. We are the primary agency to provide mass care. Mass care is broken down into three components: 1) mass sheltering, 2) mass feeding and 3) bulk distribution of supplies. In the post 9/11 world, the Red Cross is tasked with sheltering potentially upwards of hundreds of thousands of people for 90 days, which is a HUGE task. Look over the plan. There are some whoppers in there for the Red Cross! There are some whoppers in that plan for everyone! We don’t become overwhelmed with the whoppers because yes, we are the primary agency, but there are other agencies that do sheltering, such as the Salvation Army and a lot of religious groups. We all partner together but, at the same time, we realize that the Red Cross is a HUGE player in providing mass care during disasters.

Remembering the 1985 Hijacking of TWA Flight 847

In his book “Triumph over Terror on Flight 847,” published in 1987 (Fleming Revell Publishers, Old Tappan, NJ) and now out-of-print, the late Captain John Testrake, from Richmond, Missouri, describes the ordeal. Some people will remember the media reports of the 17-day hijacking, but will not know what really happened inside the airplane, including the events that led to Navy Seabee Diver Robert Stethem’s murder. Testrake’s book helps fill that knowledge gap.

BACKGROUND

The long-standing Lebanese-Israeli-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) conflict, into which the US, France, and Italy inserted themselves in the 1980s, was the setting for the TWA flight 847 hijacking.

On June 6,1982, Israeli troops invaded southern Lebanon to eradicate the PLO, which was launching its terrorist raids from there against Israel to the south. Lebanese Shiite Muslims living in southern Lebanon initially welcomed the Israelis as a respite from the PLO guerillas, but soon also turned against the Israeli who were “iron fisted” (e.g., the Israelis limited Shiites’ movement and imprisoned some).

On September 29, 1982, US Marines and French soldiers and Italian soldiers entered Beirut as part of a multinational peace-keeping force (MNF).

On April 18, 1983, a large car bomb exploded at the US Embassy in Beirut, causing massive structural damage and killing 61, including 17 Americans, and injuring 100.

On September 19, 1983, as a result of the buildup of tensions among numerous factions and nations operating in Lebanon, the USS Virginia, cruising with other American ships off Lebanon’s coast, shelled Druze** militia in the Shouf Mountains to help the beleaguered Lebanese Armed Forces hold onto a strategic mountain village. This shelling officially shifted the American role from a “presence” in Lebanon to the “direct support of Lebanese Armed Forces” and cost the US its appearance of neutrality.

On October 23, 1983, a truck loaded with thousands of pounds of explosives destroyed command headquarters of the US Marine Battalion Landing Unit located at Beirut Airport. An almost simultaneous suicide attack destroyed a building occupied by French paratroopers. US casualties were 241 killedand 70 wounded. French casualties were 58 killed.***

In early 1984, the battleship USS New Jersey shelled Muslim Beirut and its suburbs, intensifying violent anti-American feeling.

On September 6, 1984, the US vetoed a United Nations resolution condemning Israel’s ongoing tactics in Lebanon as a result of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.****

On March 8, 1985, a car bomb went off near the Beirut home of Shiite Muslim cleric Sheikh Fadlallah (who was not killed in the attack), resulting in 45 Lebanese killed and 175 injured. Lebanese Shiites widely rumored that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved with the car bomb incident.

February to June 1985, Israel pulled out of Lebanon, taking 700+ Shiite hostages with them as security for their departing troops. Instead of immediately releasing the prisoners when their withdrawal was complete, however, the Israelis moved them to Atlit prison camp in northern Israel.

THE HIJACKING

On June 14, 1985, two well-dressed non-English-speaking Lebanese Shiite Arabs boarded the TWA flight 847 along with 8 fresh crew and 143 other passengers. (A third terrorist was unable to board the full flight, but would turn up later.) They took over the plane 20 minutes after take-off.

One hijacker carried two hand grenades (and possibly a plastic bomb). The other hijacker was continuously screaming while brandishing a 9-mm pistol. The hijackers had apparently wrapped the weapons in fiberglass insulation, which prevented their detection by the Athen’s airport X-ray machines. Upon entering the cockpit, to which they gained entry by roughing up the flight attendants, the hijackers demanded to be taken to Algiers. Thus started the first leg of the zigzagging back and forth across the Mediterranean during the next 1-2 days. The hijackers’ lack of a plan and ad libbing as they went along was the first theme of the hijacking.

The hijackers identified US servicemen on board, singling out Navy Seabee Robert Stethem, whom they bound and brutally beat. Testrake wrote that Stethem made no cries—ever—despite blows that were sickening to hear. No one could respond to the beating because the second hijacker kept removing and reinserting grenade pins. Testrake considered (even in 1985) overpowering the hijackers if their only weapons had been guns, but their hand grenades enabled them to blow up the plane during a scuffle.

Testrake said, “Okay, we’ll take you to Algiers. Whatever you want. Just don’t get excited.” (p. 68) Testrake believed early during the hijacking that the hijackers only wanted a ride to another country and then would let the plane go on its way.

He then determined that the Boeing 727 had insufficient gas to reach Algiers and would need to gas up. The hijackers told him to go to Beirut. When approaching Beirut Airport for the first time, the Beirut controller, who had learned about the hijacking, told Testrake: “I am sorry, but we are closed, and you will not be allowed to land.” (p. 74) Testrake told him that he was coming anyway. The controller said, “Very well, sir, you are cleared to land. Land quietly please.” (p. 74) The second theme of the hijacking emerged: no Mediterranean airport wanted anything to do with the hijacked TWA flight 847: the American plane’s crew improvised. They refueled in Beirut.

The third theme was that the hijackers were well trained and wary. For example, they ordered Testrake to stop in the middle of the Beirut runway to avoid traps. They then demanded to speak to an official of Amal, the mainstream Shiite Muslim political and military force in Lebanon, but Amal leaders refused. Thus, emerged a fourth theme of the hijacking: Arab infighting. The hijackers permitted release of 19 hostages in this first Beirut airport stop. The plane then took off for Algiers.

When Testrake asked for permission to land in Algiers this first time, he was told by the controller: “The airport is closed. You will not be allowed to land.” (p. 78) Testrake persuaded authorities to permit landing; he was running out of fuel. The airport’s tarmac teamed with Algerian military personnel and armored vehicles and Testrake expected an imminent raid on the plane, which would result, he thought, in “a lot of people getting killed.” This was the fifth theme of the hijacking—Testrake’s fear that a direct intervention with the plane by outside authorities however well intentioned would result in loss of innocent life.

Testrake learned in Algiers during this first stop that the hijackers wanted release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, and that this was “no ordinary, run-of-the-mill hijacking.” He, his crew and their passengers were being held for ransom. He wrote: “We would be set free only in exchange for those who were being held in Israel.” (p. 78).

No outside raid took place. To refuel, the fuel truck’s driver demanded a credit card. (This is not a joke.) He used the purser’s Shell card to charge six thousand gallons ($1/gallon). The hijackers permitted release of 21 passengers in this first stop in Algiers “for humanitarian reasons.”

The hijackers ordered return to Beirut. En route they would not let Testrake talk on the radio because of fears about a raid by US Delta Forces, which were assembling. Asking for permission to land, Testrake was again told: “I am sorry but the airport is closed. You will not be allowed to land.” This second time at Beirut airport, barricades had been set up in the runways. Testrake again said he was coming anyway and would just smash into the barricades; the hijackers were planning to blow up the plane anyway. The barricades were hastily removed and flight 847 landed and waited for daybreak.

On June 15, 1985, the hijackers again demanded to speak to Amal leadership. When Amal leaders again refused, the hijackers stood the unconscious Stethem on his feet, shot him in the temple and dumped his body through the plane’s door onto the tarmac below.

When the first officer yelled into the radio, “They’ve just killed a passenger!” the reply from the tower was: “How terrible! That you would kill an innocent passenger!” According to Testrake, the tower controller was trying to embarrass and shame the hijackers. Testrake believed that Stethem was killed because he represented the American military, which the hijackers hated, and because the hijackers wanted Amal soldiers stationed at the Beirut airport to join them on the plane and would not take no for an answer. The two hijackers promised more killings if their demands were not met.

Five more gunmen then boarded the plane on the say-so of Nabih Berri, head of the Amal party (and currently speaker of the Lebanese parliament--the highest political position that a Shiite Muslim can have according to the Lebanese constitution) to prevent further bloodshed. “A Red Cross ambulance and Lebanese officials in three cars searched the runway with their headlights until they found and removed the body of Robert Stethem.” (p. 87) Middle East Airlines delivered boxes of food to the hostages. The plane was refueled.

The hijackers demanded to go to Algiers a second time. Upon arrival in Algiers, the third hijacker, who had been unable to board in Athens, boarded. Had he not been allowed to board, his two friends threatened to kill all Greek passengers on board. The third hijacker was a thief who systematically went through everyone’s personal belongings and stole cash, jewelry, and wallets. During this second stop in Algiers, 50 passengers and the 5 TWAflight attendants were released. Only American men were left on the plane, which signified to Testrake that the hijackers saw the US as the “real key to their fellow countrymen’s release, because of our supposed control of Israel.” (p. 89)

The refueled plane took off purportedly for Tehran, Iran. Testrake then informed the hijackers that the plane hadn’t enough fuel to reach Tehran and, while the hijackers were trying to figure out what to do, talked quietly with his crew to figure out some way to “stop this flying.” He wrote, “[i]t was obvious to all of us that the hijackers were fresh out of ideas and were just fumbling about without a real plan of attack.” (p. 92) Testrake believed that “they would probably keep us flying back and forth until the airplane fell apart, or until we finally ditched it into the Mediterranean.” Instead of Tehran, the hijackers consented to go a third time to Beirut.

In a brilliant move, the crew faked the failure of three of the four engines after touching down in Beirut this third time. The hijackers believed their story. Testrake said that the only way he and his crew fooled them was by first getting the hijackers to trust them. He wrote: “We had cooperated with them on everything they had asked us to do, and I believe they had begun to think of us as their friends. They were not stupid people…and it certainly would have been harder to convince them of our engine failures if they had not come to trust us.” (p. 98)

Another hostage (1 person) was released because of illness. That night, militia removed the remaining passengers (around 36) from the plane, leaving the three crew (Testrake, First Officer Maresca, and Flight Engineer Christian Zimmermann) who, for the next sixteen days, remained aboard the air-conditioned aircraft, while dozens of heavily-armed guards came and went and diplomats worked furiously.

During the 16-day stay on Beirut Airport’s tarmac, Testrake closely observed the behaviors, some of which were noxious, of the Shiite militia guarding him. These behaviors comprise the sixth theme of the hijacking. The guards excoriated the US while simultaneously adulating Ayatollah Khomeini and drinking Pepsi, wearing US tee-shirts with the names of other American-made products printed on them, and chain smoking Marlboro cigarettes, which they flicked onto the carpet of the plane (this drove Testrake crazy). Lebanese food brought to the plane was so good, the crew feared they were putting on weight and started marching up and down the aisle to get some exercise. Their captors gave them newspapers every day so they understood what was going on. Testrake wrote that he learned that Nabih Berri was “walking a tightrope” but that “President Reagan was saying that Berri could end the ordeal anytime he chose.” (p. 104) Testrake learned that Amal had taken charge of the hostages who were spread around Beirut and Hizbullah took charge of the crew and the aircraft as a “symbol of their role in this affair.”

Testrake convinced his guards to clean up the plane. They pushed all the trash out the back of the plane onto the tarmac. Every night, while the crew slept stretched out on three seats each, the guards ate, played with the radio in the cockpit and talked incessantly with tower personnel. (When a TWA crew later went into Beirut to fly the airplane home after the crisis ended, the “radio console was covered with green mold,” and, when they tried to talk to the tower via the radio, the radio’s knob fell off.) (p. 111)

The Hizbullah guards were extremely facile with their Russian weapons, even if they had a tendency to leave them lying around. They were “family oriented” and “almost every one of them” spoke about how President Reagan ordered the USS New Jersey bombardment, which killed family members. (see #1 above). The guards stole everything they could lay their hands on, including personal belongings of the three pilots and baggage below in the baggage compartment. The guards became subdued like children when Testrake would occasionally rebuke them for being inconsiderate.

The Lebanese Hizbullah guards did not understand how to use a Western bathroom. “Specifically, they didn’t know how to use the toilets. They were accustomed to Arab-style squat toilets and would stand up on the toilet seats instead of sitting down on them. And they splashed water instead of using toilet paper. They brought Evian bottled water aboard by the case and put most of it in the lavatories. Then, for their sanitary purposes they would splash water on themselves. Of course, most of the water cascaded down onto the lavatory floors and out into the aisles. It didn’t take long before the carpeting around all three lavatories was completely soaked and squished when you walked on it. (pp. 111 -112) Testrake worked out a deal with his captors, which reserved two lavatories for the captors and one for the crew.

On June 20, 1985, as one of the guards expressed his idea of flying the plane to Jerusalem and crashing it into the Knesset while the Israeli parliament was in session (I am not kidding) (p. 130), the captors arranged a media event. A reporter asked Testrake “whether he was in favor of anyone launching a rescue operation.” He responded, ‘I think we would all be dead men if they did, because we’re continually surrounded by many, many guards.’ I hoped that statement would be heard clearly, especially by the people associated with the Delta Force.” (p. 132)

On June 24, 1985, Israeli leaders freed 31 Lebanese Shiite Muslim prisoners, but denied that it was linked to the demands of Lebanese gunmen holding the crew hostage. ******

On June 30, 1985, the captors released the remaining American hostages including the crew. They were taken to Damascus, Syria, and flown from there to Washington, DC. Captain Testrake rested one month at home and then resumed his career as a pilot.

On July 4, 1985, Israel loaded “300 of Israel's 735 Lebanese prisoners onto buses in preparation for their release, three days after Shiite gunmen released 39 American hijacked hostages held in Beirut.” Again, Rabin denied a link to the release of the American hostages. Military sources said the remaining 435 Lebanese prisoners being held in Israel would be released ‘soon’ under Israel's policy of freeing the detainees in accordance with the security ..”*******

THE AFTERMATH

In 1994, the US Navy launched USS Stethem DDG 63 in honor of Robert Dean Stethem, who was also posthumously awarded the Purple Heart and Bronze Star and buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

In 1996, one of the hijackers, Mohammed Homadi, was arrested in Frankfurt, Germany, while trying to board a plane with liquid explosives. He was tried there and sentenced to life in prison. Germany refused to extradite Homadi to the US for trial. Three others involved in the hijacking were Imad Mugniyah, Hassan Izz-Al-Din and Ali Atwa. They were indicted in Beirut but never brought to US justice. In 2002, their names were added to the FBI Most Wanted Terrorists list.

On February 6, 1996, Captain Testrake died of cancer. Here is the tribute from Captain Randolph Babbitt, president the American Air Line Pilots Association:

“The aviation community mourns the loss of Captain John Testrake. His heroism during the 16-day hijacking of TWA Flight 847 exemplified the professionalism and dedication of airline pilots everywhere. No one who saw it will ever forget the picture of Captain Testrake and the armed terrorist at the cockpit window of his aircraft. On behalf of the members of his union and airline pilots around the world, I know that we will miss him, but we shall never forget him.”

Sources:

*For more information on Hizbullah, see Biot #174, “Khomeini: Godfather of Lebanon’s Hizbullah” at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_174.html and Biot #183, “ Lebanon’s Hizbullah—Conventional Political Party or Terrorist Group?” at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_183.html.

** For more information on the Druze, see Biot #176 “Who Are the Druze?
At: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_176.html.

*** For a detailed account of the October 23, 1983 attack, see the Report of the
”DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983” (also called the Long Commission,” available at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/
Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html.

**** For UN Security Council voting record on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
see: http://sunship.com/mideast/info/draftres.html.

***** “Visits to the US by Foreign Heads of State and Government—1985”
at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/15743.htm.

******“Deal to release 40 Americans reported Israel to free 31 Shiites, but denies a link.” [ Midwest Edition, C] Chicago Tribune wires. Chicago Tribune (pre-1997 Fulltext). Chicago, Ill.: Jun 24, 1985. pg. 1.

******* “ Israel ready to free 300; [Sports Final, C Edition], Associated Press. Chicago Tribune (pre-1997 Fulltext). Chicago, Ill.: Jul 3, 1985. pg. 19.

US Marines 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing:
Original Terrorist Template for Attacking Americans

In June 1982, the US Marines had just arrived to the US Naval Station in Rota, Spain, en route to war-lacerated Lebanon to help manage the surge in new problems. Within a few hours of tying up at Rota, Marine Colonel James M. Mead heard that things in Lebanon had suddenly gotten even worse. “The message traffic was swelling with stories of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attacking into southern Lebanon. At first, the Israeli objective seemed limited to a 40-kilometer artillery buffer zone in southern Lebanon to protect northern Israel from the shelling of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). A few days later, the Israelis would attack Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in the Bekaa Valley of central Lebanon and eventually encircle the capital city of Beirut in an attempt to destroy the PLO and thereby neuter their political and military influence in the region.”*

Lebanon in 1982 was a dangerously unstable and violent country torn by civil conflict. Iran-backed Syria-backed Lebanese Shiite Muslims and the inscrutable Druze, led by Walid Jumblatt** were fighting Christian Maronites who had long controlled Lebanon’s government. At the same time, Israelis were trying to eradicate their sworn enemy, Sunni Muslim Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas, from the bases on Lebanese soil from which they conducted their terrorist operations. Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943, and French troops were withdrawn in 1946.

The US Marines had intervened in Lebanon two previous times. The first time was July-October 1958 when President Camille Chamoun asked for US assistance because Lebanon civil war between Christian Maronites and Muslims was imminent, and Syria was readying to invade Lebanon in support of the Muslims. The second time was in July 1976 when they assisted the evacuation of 160 American civilians and 148 foreign nationals when protracted factional fighting in Beirut threatened their lives and safety.

The thinking contributing to Reagan’s decision to deploy Marines to Lebanon involved the opposing beliefs of two camps of administration officials. In one camp were special envoy Philip Habib (eventually replaced) and Judge William Clark, head of the National Security Council (NSC), who advocated sending the Marines to 1) oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon, 2) to do so as “a first step toward building the authority of the current” Christian Maronite government, followed by helping the government to expand its “authority throughout the rest of the county, 3) rid Lebanon of all foreign troops---Israeli and Syrian alike, and 4) use the Lebanese success to jumpstart the Middle East peace process.

In the other camp were the military, represented by its civilian head, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They believed that sending the Marines as a peacekeeping force was NOT a military mission. “The Marines were not being asked to take out some hostiles,” said Francis West, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (Scott, p.3) Weinberger lost the fight to keep US Marines out of Lebanon, but was able to impose time and role limits on the Marines’ peacekeeping mission. They would go there solely to ensure a peaceful evacuation of the PLO, and ‘in no case,’ President Reagan told reporters at a press conference, would they ‘stay longer than 30 days.’”

On August 28, 1982, the PLO began its pull-out from Beirut, under the watchful eyes of the multinational force (MNF) of US Marines and French and Italian troops. The evacuation took three days. Christian Maronite Bashir Gemayel, backed by Israel and the US, was elected to the presidency, and Weinberger ordered the Marines back home in mid-September, 1982, 12 days ahead of schedule.

The rest of the MNF left on September 14, 1982. That same day, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated “almost surely at Syrian direction “at the headquarters of his Christian Phalange militia, where he was officially resigning his party post to become president. (Scott, p. 4) The Israelis, over US protests, immediately moved into Beirut and permitted Phalangists, in reprisal for Gemayel’s death, to target PLO members in two PLO camps (Sabra and Shatila). Hundreds of civilians, whose safety the US government had more or less guaranteed, were murdered during the rampage. Within 48 hours, the White House redeployed US forces to Lebanon, again over the objections of Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Approximately 1,600 US Marines arrived back to Beirut, along with the other MNF troops on September 29, 1982 and set up camp at the Beirut Airport. The Pentagon made the decision to locate the Marines at the airport for three reasons: the Marines could evacuate quickly, receive supplies easily, and signal to the various warring Lebanese factions that they were not there to fight anyone (and would fire only in self-defense).

While the Marines hunkered down to keep the peace, the US State Department and the NSC again tried to solve the problems of the troubled Middle East. Their goals, embodied in the “Reagan Plan,” remained the same as before: 1) lessen regional tensions by ending the occupation of Lebanon by both Syrian and Israeli troops, each backed by their superpower (USSR and US, respectively), and 2) use the success in Lebanon to jumpstart the Middle East peace process stalled since the Camp David accords of the Carter administration. In April 1983, terrorists smashed a stolen GMC pickup loaded with explosives into the U.S. Embassy, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. Reagan’s “May 17” agreement” faltered because Israel agreed to withdraw if Syria agreed, and Syria did not agree.

Then the civil war began once again to heat up. Amin Gemayel, who had succeeded is murdered older brother Bashir, was unable to govern the factions. In July 1983, the Druze in the Shouf Mountains began to shell the Marines in their vulnerable outpost, causing numerous casualties. The Marines returned fire in self-defense on August 28, 1983, drawing a sharp response from Walid Jumblatt who “announced on September 1 [1983] that the Marines would henceforth be considered enemy forces. From that point, there was a steady escalation in US involvement in the fighting. On September 7, at the president’s direction, F-14 fighters launched from carriers in the waters off Beirut were used to locate hostile positions in the mountains; the following day, for the first time, naval gunfire was used against them. On September 19, offshore destroyers fired on Druze positions in the Shouf in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, which were defending the strategically situated town of Suq-al-Gharb. Finally, again at the president’s orders, the battleship USS New Jersey, boasting huge 16-inch guns, arrived off Beirut on September 25, 1983.” (Scott, p. 6) The sheer thought of its arrival caused Syria’s President Assad (backing the Druze) to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Gemayel government and enter into a cease-fire. The shelling of the Marines at the airport stopped.

Then, on the morning of Sunday, October 23, 1983, shortly after sunrise over the Shouf Mountains, “a Mercedes truck was spotted barreling across a parking lot that separated the Beirut airport terminal form the temporary US Marine headquarters. Skirting san-bagged bunkers and crashing through a series of barbed wire fences and gates, the truck dodged the bullets from a sentry’s rifle and headed straight for the building where some 300 Marines lay sleeping. As witnesses watched in horror, the driver smashed the truck through the remaining barriers and into the lobby of the headquarters, where he detonated 2,600 pounds of explosives. Within seconds, the four-story building was reduced to a heap of rubble, trapping hundreds of dead and wounded soldiers under the crushing weight of broken cement and cinder blocks. Minutes later, a similar attack destroyed a nearby barracks housing French paratroopers.” (Scott, p. 1). The resulting explosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had ever been detonated on the face of the Earth, equal in force to between 15,000 and 21,000 pounds of TNT. The death toll was 241 Marines and 56 French paratroopers

On May 30, 2003, US District Judge Roy Lambert ruled that “ Iran was responsible for the 1983 suicide bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 241 American servicemen. The truck bombing was carried out by Hizbullah with the approval and funding of Iran's senior government officials. [Judge Lamberth] ordered that the plaintiffs in the case -- the servicemen wounded in that bombing and the families of those killed -- have a "right to obtain judicial relief" from Iran. The judge called the October 23, 1983 bombing ‘the most deadly state-sponsored terrorist attack made against United States citizens before September 11, 2001.’”****

The 1983 Beirut bomb began the era of terror, according to many observers, because it gave terrorists a major victory.***** They drove US forces from Lebanon (February 1984), provided other terrorists with a blueprint for attacking Americans, inspired Osama bin Laden through the “demonstration effect,”****** and sent the unintended message to the Arab world that “enough body bags would prompt Western withdrawal, not retaliation.” The terrorists’ strategy of “asymmetric warfare”******* against a superpower had been successful.

“There's no question it was a major cause of 9/11,” said John Lehman, the then-secretary of the Navy, who was also a member of the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks. “We told the world that terrorism succeeds…The Beirut bombing taught the United States more about protecting troops and picking battles. Using the military for peacekeeping, leaders learned, can be just as hazardous as fighting a well-defined enemy. Policymakers realized that “presence” is not a mission, and commanders became increasingly reluctant to commit troops to peacekeeping efforts unless they were welcomed by all sides [e.g., a recent example is the U.S. role in Liberia, when both sides in a civil war requested American troops.] The concept of ‘force protection’ came of age after the barracks attack. Rules of engagement are less limiting, and security around U.S. forces is tighter. ‘We go in heavy,’ said P.J. Crowley, a retired Air Force colonel and former special assistant for national security affairs to President Clinton. ‘We have a plan for protecting our forces.’”*****

Sources:

* “The US Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984, Chapter 2: Beirut I--Evacuating the PLO
25 August-- 10 September 1982. Available at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast
/Lebanon-1982-1984/USMC-Lebanon82/USMC-Lebanon82-2.html.

** See “Who are the Druze?” at www. http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_176.html.

*** “The US Marines in Lebanon” by Esther Scott for the Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1991. Available for a modest fee at: http://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/. This quote came from an unnamed State Department official. See p. 2.

**** “ Iran responsible for 1983 Marine barracks bombing, judge rules.” CNN, Friday, May 30, 2003 Posted: 11:14 PM EDT, : (0314 GMT) available at: http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/30/iran.barracks.bombing/.

***** “1983 Beirut bomb began era of terror” by Scott Dodd and Peter Smolowitz, Sunday, October 19, 2003 , Knight Ridder Newspapers, at: http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,515039782,00.html.

****** For more on “demonstration effect” go to “What Is Demonstration Effect?” at:
http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_173.html.

******* For more on “asymmetric warfare, go to “What Is Asymmetric Warfare?”
at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_167.html.

Clearfield , Utah ’s Successful Emergency Mass Medical Care for Meningitis Prophylaxis

On May 1, 2005, staff members at the residential Job Corps Center in Clearfield ( Davis County), Utah (20 miles north of Salt Lake City), sent a 19-year old male student to the hospital for flu-like symptoms that laboratory tests subsequently confirmed was invasive meningococcal disease due to Neisseria meningitidis.

Clearfield Job Corps Center is operated by Management and Training Corporation (MTC), a private contractor to the federal Job Corps, a U.S. Department of Labor-funded academic, vocation, and social skills-training program for 16 to 24 year old men and women started in 1964. MTC operates 24 of the 122 Job Corps Centers. Clearfield Jobs Corp enrolls 1,320 students (980 males, 320 females) of which 1,300 live on campus. The Job Corps has had five cases of meningitis in the last four years, according to one source.*

Following determination that the 19-year-old student was infected with N. meningitidis, Davis County Health Department staff members were notified and responded to the Job Corps to investigate the student’s illness and identify who was at risk. An official of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), also “assisted in the local investigation process to better understand the spread of this bacterial infection in an institutional setting.” The Health Department administered antibiotics to between 20 and 30 people who were determined to have had close contact with the infected student.** The patient, as of May 25, 2005, remains hospitalized in Salt Lake City.

On May 8, 2005, a second female student at Clearfield Job Corps was hospitalized briefly and then returned to the infirmary at the Job Corps. Her blood test, positive on May 11, 2005, showed that she also was infected with N. meningitidis. An investigation began to trace her close contacts. Health officials have not found a direct link between the two infected patients.

Health officials from Davis County and the Utah Department of Health decided that a mass vaccination and antibiotic clinic at Job Corps was appropriate. By noon on May 12, 2005, health officials had assembled 1,500 doses each of antibiotic and vaccine. Over the next two days, nurses and physicians dispensed antibiotics to 1,200, and vaccinated 1,400, individuals, including many Job Corps staff members. Many people received both antibiotics and vaccination.

“A large-scale public health effort runs like an assembly line,” commented one observer. “They set up tables and equipment and brought students in 20-30 at a time, where it was explained what would happen. They were given questions for screening. Then each one talked too a nurse individually. A physician or nurse practitioner review dandy questions about contraindications and made the call.”*** Christy Porucznik, epidemic intelligence officer with the Utah Department of Health was “amazed [at] how fast they were able to put all this together.”***

CDC staff were interested in the carriage rates of the infection, which involved obtaining throat swabs from a sampling of the people receiving treatment to measure the population that was carrying the bacteria, according to Lewis Garrett, director of the Davis County Health Department. This step also involved processing laboratory specimens. “Preliminary findings indicate that a higher number of individuals in the Job Corps population than expected carried traces of the bacteria.”*** Garrett pointed out that very few carriers ever get sick from the bacteria they harbor in their throats and noses. There is no correlation between carriage rates and disease rates, he cautioned, but the CDC study hopefully will shed light on how some people coexist nicely with the bacteria while others become very ill when exposed to it.

Davis County had had practice in setting up and operating a mass vaccination clinic as a result of a bioterrorism preparedness drill conducted in 2004 in which approximately 200 emergency workers, school personnel and police received hepatitis A vaccine and tetanus injections at Viewmont High School. This drill helped public health staff iron out bottlenecks and institute other improvements, such as using cordons to keep people in line.

Sources:

* New case of bacteria hits Clearfield” by Kimberly Jahnke, Standard-Examiner Davis Bureau, Friday, May 13, 2005, available at: http://www.standard.net/standard/news/50241.

** Davis County Health Department News Release on May 12, 2005, available at:
http://hlunix.hl.state.ut.us/pio/pdf/051205-BacterialInfectionatJobCorps.pdf
#search='bacterial%20infection%20at%20clearfield%20job%20corps'.

*** “Mass vaccination at Job Corps a ‘clinic’ in bioterror readiness” by Lois M. Collins, Deseret Morning News, Thursday, May 26, 2005.
Available at: http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,600136799,00.html.

Lawsuit Preparedness Following SNS Deployment
in a Public Health Emergency

The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), the not-for-profit organization for state-level health commissioners and their senior deputies,* has recently (2005) published “Interstate Planning for the Strategic National Stockpile: Supplement on Legal Issues.”** It explores legal issues raised following publication of its earlier paper titled “Interstate Planning for the Strategic National Stockpile: Experiences in Five Regions” (2005).***

According to the Executive Summary of the legal paper, “[t]he Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) program provides medicines and supplies to states facing a public health emergency. In ‘Interstate Planning for the Strategic National Stockpile: Experiences in Five Regions,’ ASTHO documented how states are cooperating with one another to improve their SNS response. States are strengthening inter-jurisdictional planning by increasing communication, holding joint exercises, and working together to overcome resource issues. Many are now focusing their attention on the legal implications of interstate SNS response.”

The Executive Summary goes on: “Unresolved issues have the potential to impede the deployment of the SNS, reduce out-of-state personnel and volunteer participation in emergency management efforts, and lead to significant post-event liability” (p.1) So we now have a new disaster preparedness scenario to consider: lawsuit hell following a public health emergency.

What are the legal issues described by ASTHO? They are:

1. Interstate sharing of personnel;
2. Federal decision making process for SNS allocation; and
3. Liability for asset transfer across state borders.

“Failure to address liability issues in advance may discourage states from sharing personnel and discourage both in-state and out-of-state volunteers,” ASTHO warns.

The root problem apparently is this: there are currently only 12 push packages and there are 50 states! The CDC anticipates that SNS materiel may need to be shared among states in the event of a large-scale emergency or one occurring along a state’s border. The ASTHO authors are very concerned that “[t]here is no stated mechanism for determining which states receive the SNS push package if there are competing requests. The lack of a formal process for facilitating sharing could lead to legal conflicts during or after the emergency [that is, assuming enough lawyers are still alive to bring lawsuits to court.]

For example, if assets such as gauze pads and morphine are transferred across state borders, say from Kansas City, Missouri, to Kansas City, Kansas, the transferring state may be held liable for timely delivery and compliance with lengthy federal regulations. If all does not go well in the transfer or the transfer does not occur because of conflicts, the ever-vigilant media will “likely highlight” this and thus “undermine the public’s faith in the emergency management efforts,” again warns ASTHO.

What is the solution to this potential problem? The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)**** is a good starting point for addressing personnel sharing issues, according to ASTHO, but does not cover every issue of potential concern to states, says ASTHO. [EMAC is an interstate mutual aid agreement that allows states to assist one another in responding to all kinds of natural and man-made disasters, sponsored by the National Emergency Management Association*****, a group of approximately 380 state emergency management directors and others with an interest in emergency management.******]

The conclusion ASTHO offers is for individual states to pursue four strategies:

“1. Initiate dialogue with the CDC to clarify asset allocation and liability issues.

2. Review EMAC in light of state plan.

3. Review own and neighboring state laws for protecting personnel outside of EMAC provisions.

4. Consider side agreements as a possible solution to remaining legal issues between states.” (p. 6)

Sources:

*For more information on ASTHO, see http://www.astho.org/?template=preparedness.html and SEMP Biot #138: “American Public Health Accreditation Movement” at: http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_138.html.

** “ Interstate Planning for the Strategic National Stockpile: Supplement on Legal Issues” at: http://www.astho.org/pubs/SNS_supplement.pdf.

*** “ Interstate Planning for the Strategic National Stockpile: Experiences in Five Regions” at:http://www.astho.org/pubs/SNSfinalreport.pdf.

****EMAC info at: http://www.emacweb.org/.

*****NEMA info at: www.nemaweb.org.

****** Encyclopedia of Associations, 40 th edition (2003), vol. 1, National Organizations of the US, p. 569